Conference Program

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has raised compelling questions about the ability to "win" in an era of competition rather than open conflict. After decades of U.S. preparations to meet the Soviet—and subsequently Russian—threat on the battlefield, few would have anticipated that the most effective means of degrading Russian combat power would be proxy wars like the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89) and the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-Present). Therefore, as bloodletting (i.e., intervening in an adversary's conflict to increase costs on them) via local proxies becomes a potentially more viable strategy for the United States, this paper will ask the following research question: Under what conditions is bloodletting an effective means of degrading adversary military capabilities? The dependent variable (DV) will be the military effectiveness of bloodletting, defined as an attrition of adversary military capabilities sufficient to prevent them from engaging in another conventional war for a certain period of time. The independent variables (IVs) will be alternative conditions that make bloodletting more or less effective, including internal factors within the proxy actors (e.g., regime type, level of organization, etc.) and external factors between great powers and their proxies (e.g., scale and type of military support from great powers, etc.). The paper will use a mixed-methods research design, including: a literature review to identify IVs; historical case-study analysis to test the impact of different conditions on the effectiveness of bloodletting strategies; and statistical analysis to control for other variables and test alternative hypotheses. The paper will conclude with policy recommendations for the United States.

While competition with China and Russia and their persistent use of Irregular Warfare as a tool of strategic competition is undeniable, there is far less consensus about the gravity of transnational threats as a critical impediment to both domestic and international peace and stability. Extreme weather patterns and rising sea levels threaten to erode and ultimately destroy critical infrastructure—both civil and military. Moreover, public health is increasingly at risk as average global temperatures balloon; epidemics and pandemics will grow more likely and potent. All states must contend with these threats, although their performance will be uneven. Those that can withstand them will compete more effectively in the coming decades and provide greater security for their populations. National security mandates must expand to address the nexus of threats emanating from strategic competition and transnational crises. This requires emphasis on resilience at the national and international levels.

To win the peace, allied security strategies should be built around a framework of collective resilience, defined as “the collective capacity of allied states to withstand, fight through, and quickly recover from disruption caused by military and non-military threats caused by adversaries and global challenges.” In the coming decades, security—from the individual to the national level—will require the ability to withstand transnational threats as much as those posed by adversary campaigns. Cultivating the power of collective resilience among allies and partners is the overlooked lynchpin for success in the changing security environment.