Conference Program

The debate about the length of the term the executive organs can remain in power has been present in Latin American politics since the 19th century when the countries in the region gained independence. From then on the notion of continuity of the presidential term or lack thereof has been subject to change, leading to the formation of strong legal traditions for and against reelections, both evident in various constitutional amendments (successful and attempted ones) in extending or decreasing the limit of terms the Head of State can remain in power. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the reelectionist practices in the selected Latin American countries in the 21st century in terms of their continuity, changes and contestations along with their relations to the constitutional rule of law. The leading argument is the following: all constitutional stances towards the presidential reelectionism produce and sustain strong political elitism, legitimizing political elites in more explicit or implicit way depending on the country. At the same time, the Author of this paper attempts to answer following research questions:

What are the legal traditions towards the presidential reelections in Latin America?;

What are the current arguments and actions associated with them behind extending or decreasing the limits of presidential terms in the selected Latin American countries and how are they associated with the creation and strengthening of local political elites?;

Is it possible to create a typology of relations between the formal (constitutional) stances towards reelectionism and the legitimization of political elites?

The aim of the research is to present and assess the policy-making process of Laurentino Cortizo-the president of Panama. His 5-year term in office finishes in May 2024 so it seems appropriate to try to evaluate his policies.

The interplay between political decision-making, governance structures and socio-economic development was present in the policy landscape of the country during the period under study. The events which took place between 2019 and 2024 affected both political and socio-economic aspects of the lives of the Panamanians. The paper will try to portray how the main political actor (the president) dealt with his role and how the measures applied by Laurentino Cortizo were received by the other actor, namely the society.

The time of the presidency of Cortizo was very eventful: the Covid pandemic, the natural resources problems and the social unrest. The interactions between the two main socio-political actors in Panama proved the leadership dynamics. The presentation will deal with the highlights of the presidency and the ability or inability of the president to tackle the crises and implement his leadership style.

The methods used will involve qualitative data analysis – content analysis of speeches and political documents and passive observation of the events.

The research aims to measure if the leadership approach and the policies of the president showed his adaptability and responsiveness to challenges.

Panama due to its geostrategic location plays an important role in the politics in the region of Latin America.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between criminal governance and the internationalization of criminal organizations, focusing on the expansion of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) into Europe. The underlying hypothesis is that local criminal governance plays a crucial role in driving the process of organized crime internationalization. The findings reveal a causal mechanism with distinct stages. In the first stage, it becomes evident that the imposition of rules and the standardization of ideas by the PCC facilitated the governance of its members. This enabled the faction's expansion from the Brazilian prison system into key trafficking countries like Paraguay and Bolivia, while also allowing for effective management of activities in Europe. Moving on to the second stage, the study identifies the creation of governance mechanisms within the criminal market. These mechanisms provided the group with legitimacy, allowing them to conduct business and establish partnerships beyond their home state. Examples include collaborations with Bolivian cocaine producers and European mafias. In the final stage, civilian governance, though to a lesser extent, proved crucial for the group's prominence in strategic locations facilitating its expansion into Europe, such as the Baixada Santista area. This expansion facilitated the presence of PCC members and partners in European territory, solidifying its proto-mafia status. The study underscores the significance of ongoing analysis of criminal governance for a comprehensive understanding of the cross-border criminal organization future developments.

The purpose of this paper is first to present organized crime in Guatemala as a network of multiple actors, whose activities are possible mainly thanks to corruption, then, emphasize the weakness of the state and its institutions (excluding the army) as the main reasons for such pervasive corruption and organized crime, and finally to assess the role of the institutions in combating corruption.

At the root of Guatemala’s problems with corruption and organized crime is the weakness of the state. State institutions, apart from the army, were never strongly developed because it was not in the interest of the elites, who protected their wealth and unequal distribution of goods, especially land. Although the civil war in Guatemala ended 28 years ago and democracy returned to the country, its democratic leaders failed to carry out comprehensive reforms, mainly the one of the justice system that could guarantee the effective eradication of corruption from the police, army, government struc-tures and administration.

The 2023 electoral process was also marred by corruption, starting with the exclusion from the elec-toral race of three important candidates, through illegal attempts to suspend the legal personality of the current president Bernardo Arévalo's party, until the inauguration of the new parliament and pres-ident, which was deliberately delayed by eight hours.

I will end my paper with summary of actions taken by the new administration of President Arévalo in terms of combating corruption and organized crime, and an assessment of what chances he has to implement the changes.