Conference Program

Foreign Policy can be characterized by dualism – the interplay of two different sources of norms contestation – internal and external. The paper addresses how national foreign policy is adapting to norms contestation via institutional legitimation and the national identity-building process. It also discusses how the norms contestation process ensures normative resilience and continuity in the foreign policy domain. The theoretical backbone of the paper is focused on the foreign and security policy dynamics and is aimed at figuring out the major internal and external drivers of foreign and security policy change. This paper focuses on the social constructivist contribution to the FPA and Security Studies, and in particular on the explanation of major driving factors of foreign policy change. Empirically it addresses norms contestation in Lithuanian foreign and security policy, by distinguishing national interests, and their change in the light of national identity, values, and norms, as well as by taking into account internal-national and international political dynamics and contestation stemming from outside. The paper discusses how the interplay of internal and external norms contestation affects the change in foreign policy priorities.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine has stimulated a vivid debate on Russia’s relations with states which used to belong to the Soviet Union. This article contributes to this discussion by focusing on Russia’s two ‘strategic partners’, Belarus and Tajikistan, and shifting the focus from Russia’s to these countries’ perspectives. By seeking to uncover the underlying attitudes and expectations informing the elites’ conduct, the article unpacks the black boxes of states and recognises elites’ agency in shaping their countries’ relationships with Russia. By that, we approach geopolitics from the perspective of political elites’ perceptions, aligning with critical geopolitics. This means that we do not see geographical features such as location and resources as decisive per se in how Belarus and Tajikistan interact with Russia, and vice versa. Instead, following Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) we see geopolitics as a practice enacted by political actors which involves strategic framing of geography and power games between involved actors. The article thus analyses how the behaviour of Belarusian and Tajikistani ruling elites towards the Russian government has evolved from the late Soviet period until now, exploring underlying expectations and attitudes informing their conduct. While the Belarusian and Tajik governments appear to be dependent on Russia and, consequently, generally supportive of its politics in the global arena, the article argues that this alignment has been highly strategic. Throughout the years, Belarusian and Tajik political elites have skilfully navigated power and economic asymmetries by adopting various tactics and using Russia’s emergent neo-imperial mindset and their geographical location to their benefit.

The United Kingdom’s (UK) departure from the European Union (EU) has led to a shift in its position on the international arena, which impacted the transformation of its foreign policy and its roles in the international community. The goal of this paper is to analyse the change in UK’s foreign policy before and after 31st January 2020, when Britain officially stopped being a member of EU. The main scientific approach that will be used to analyse this issue will be Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Furthermore, the paper will explore the redefinition of UK’s roles towards EU and the rest of the world, as well as, the impact of UK’s government “Global Britain” idea on its foreign policy. In addition to this, the article will look into the structural changes of UK’s Foreign Office, which was merged with the Department for International Development, in order to fulfil the tasks and goals of the “new” British foreign policy after 2020. Finally, this article will try to answer the question if the shift in UK’s foreign policy was more of an evolution or a revolution.

This paper seeks to explore the juxtaposition of the European Union's (EU) foreign policy in Afghanistan with that of the United States of America (USA), particularly in the context of the Taliban's unexpected consolidation of power in August 2021. The pivotal question guiding this inquiry is: how did the EU, despite over two decades of international engagement, find itself unprepared for such a turn of events in Afghanistan? This study underscores the significance of the EU's role as a complementary, yet distinct, actor in the broader spectrum of international response initially spearheaded by the USA post the 9/11 attacks. The analysis reveals the EU's external actions in Afghanistan, while substantial in terms of development and humanitarian aid, were marred by strategic inadequacies and a failure to adapt to evolving security dynamics and shifts in US policy. It critically evaluates the EU's approach to state-building, highlighting the misstep of treating Afghanistan as a 'blank slate' for modern statecraft and the overlooked necessity of engaging in peacebuilding negotiations with the Taliban. While acknowledging the EU's successes, including a temporary peace accord, this study also delves into the EU's delayed response to systemic corruption and its misaligned objectives with the USA's more immediate strategic goals, providing a comprehensive comparative analysis of transatlantic foreign policy towards Afghanistan.