Conference Program

China has presented a unique and unprecedented challenge to the legitimacy and relevance of the US-sponsored Liberal international order (LIO). At the same time, the US and EU have failed to adequately or reasonably accommodate China into global IPE leadership, e.g. in the IFIs and most global summitry.

China-US confrontation effectively stalls out the badly needed global IPE leadership and governance that benefits not only both powers but also most countries worldwide.

This paper addresses the “demand” for Chinese-US co-leadership and global governance in the context of what could be a renovated and updated form of “embedded liberalism.” In this context, we collect and analyze possible historical, empirical precedents for incorporating non-democratic, illiberal, and non-western political regimes into productive IPE regimes. We seek to understand how China varies from, and compares with, these other country cases in terms of the roles played and ‘disruptions’ caused? We aim to draw lessons and insights from the past for both engaging and disciplining China, despite its tilt to strong authoritarianism blended with a state-managed “neoliberalism.” Our research asks how integrative and resilient the failing, US-led LIO can and should be to accommodate a China that it has failed to assimilate? What would be the key dimensions of an IPE order incorporating a renovated embedded liberalism?

This paper aims to analyze the increasingly important role of China in the international monetary system, highlighting its current role, as well as its possible scope as part of a strategy to challenge the US dollar and strengthen its international position. For this, two central aspects are examined: the increasing use of the yuan in international trade, especially in multilateral alliances such as the BRICS, and the promotion of a financial system parallel to that of the West. This work uses a quantitative methodology, since the main economic variables of China are analyzed to make a descriptive statistical analysis.

As an economy with the world's second-largest GDP, China is a leading state in industrial manufacturing and advanced technologies. As such, it plays a substantial role in international trade, until a couple of years ago its transactions were carried out mainly in US dollars, however, in recent years and as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the successive chain of Western sanctions on Russia have prompted China to address more cautiously the implications of using the dollar in its transactions and the possible risks that this may entail.

Consequently, the Asian giant has promoted initiatives with its commercial and political partners, for a growing use of the yuan and other currencies, in order to minimize the possible risks of a monetary dependency on the US dollar. The foregoing is generating a reorganization of the international monetary system.

To address concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative's (BRI's) environmental impact, China imbued the BRI with an environmental governance architecture to transform it into a climate-neutral and nature-positive "Green BRI". Using this architecture and its bilateral engagement with BRI states, Beijing has produced a distinct environmental diplomacy discourse. This study assesses the potential of this discourse to materialise on the ground by focusing on synergies between the United Nations 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda; SDGs) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the BRI's pilot and most expensive component. While the CPEC–2030 Agenda coupling works in the environmental diplomacy discourse, the expectation that countries (e.g. China) will help their peers achieve their goals may be unrealistic. Nevertheless, foreign policy—especially vis-a-vis low-income, fragile countries, which suffer from both powerlessness in addressing the SDGs and high sensitivity to external actors' behaviour (e.g. Pakistan)—can significantly affect countries' capabilities in achieving the SDGs, in both positive and negative ways. This leads to the question of whether the BRI is an example of how a foreign policy strategy can influence SDG implementation. To what extent does this synergy apply to the environmental SDGs, especially goals 7 and 13? Does this synergy have a positive or negative impact on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda—specifically these SDGs—given the enormous environmental challenges related to the BRI?

Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow. As the global dependence on semiconductors is increasing and the industry is resting on geopolitical tightrope, this paper digs into the intricate dance of government policies shaped by their interests and the complex web of supply chains. Focusing on the complicated triangle of USA, China and Taiwan to shed light on eruption of a potential conflict and disruption in the supply lines due to the emergence of “made in China 2025 Plan” and the USA’s Chips and science Act are prime examples of this work. Taiwan being the undisputed silicon kingpin is caught between the superpowers. The pursuit of self-sufficiency can lead to increased protectionism and trade barriers in-turn fragmenting the supply chain and creating vulnerabilities. The strategic rivalry between USA and China and the Taiwanese equation adds another layer of uncertainity. Any such disruption would lead to consequences for consumer electronics to critical national security infrastructure. Decoding these geopolitical tensions to ensure smooth flow of semiconductors is primary goal of this work while exploring conflict management strategies through cooperative approach to build resilience through diplomatic channels is the other goal. In conclusion, by unravelling various geopolitical realities and the future of semiconductor supply chains to gain deeper insights for collective action by all stakeholders to prioritise collaboration parallel to that of competition to mitigate risks in this critical industry by employing a blend of analytical, statical and qualitative approach.