Conference Program

The objective of the paper is to elucidate the role of international linkage and leverage, as outlined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, as a variable that ultimately shapes a distinct course of the de-democratization process in Poland compared to Hungary. While we recognize that there may be several factors contributing to the divergence in the de-democratization paths of Poland and Hungary, we propose examining this phenomenon through the prism of the linkage and leverage theory, previously utilized to explain democratization processes in both countries during the 1990s. In this instance, the application of the linkage and leverage concept aims to identify the reasons for the varied de-democratization trajectories. We intend to demonstrate that Poland, unlike Hungary, exhibits a higher level of engagement in cooperation with Europe and the USA, rendering it more vulnerable to external influences (leverage). This susceptibility is evident in factors such as the presence of the USA in Poland and the role of European funds.

We sometimes reach inflection points where the nature of change is drastic and dramatic and the most basic assumptions are upturned. The contemporary zeitgeist of international relations is steadily moving towards a state of chaos and randomness. The world is undergoing huge transformation and the holes in the world order are quite manifest. We are entering the age of entropy, a chaotic period where anything can happen and little can be predicted. States grapple with volatile moth eaten international landscape to adjust their foreign policy strategies to secure their interest. Geopolitical hotspots simmering with crises after crises be it Russia- Ukraine, Israel- Palestine, Nagornokarbakah and a new geopolitical hotspot may unfold in the Indo-Pacific between China and America, since both the states are locked in a Thucydides trap. However the fault lines get further compounded by global rise of populism, polarization and post-truth which are adding fuel to the fire to the fragile ecosystem of international relations. Emerging revanchist powers bridled by autocrats like Putin, Xijinping, Victor Orban, Recep Tayip Erdogan etc. These 3P political actors acquire power through a reasonably democratic elections and then set out to dismantle the checks on executive power through 3P framework. This new bizarre phenomenon of emerging powers bridled by autocrats have visceral animosity to the rule based international order and are challenging the contours of world order and pumping negative energy leading eventually to global ennui.

Populist movements have been gaining strength in the European Union member states in recent years. As a matter of fact, it is predicted that the parties representing this trend will increase their number of seats significantly in the 2024 elections of the European Parliament. It is important to understand the reasons for this and to identify how various crises, especially the pandemic, have affected populist approaches.

This study aims to reveal how populist approaches are in a relationship during the pandemic period and how populist politics have affected the European Union in the recent period. To this end, it is important to identify similarities and differences in the responses of populist actors across the Union. Although populists have been ousted from power in many European countries, they are still successful in elections and continue to influence political discourse. This has consequences for the future of the EU, among others. Populist "anti-European" parties are on course for major gains in the European Parliament elections in June, which could shift the balance of the parliament sharply to the right and jeopardise key elements of the EU agenda, including climate action.

By combining the insights of academics with the practical strategies of practitioners, it becomes possible to develop a more comprehensive and effective response to populism as a driver for contestation. The key is to address the underlying issues that contribute to the appeal of populist movements while strengthening democratic institutions and fostering inclusive and informed societies.

International relations scholars are divided over the ways the world (of states) is perceived. For realist writers, the world should be taken as it is, and the goal is to find a better position in it. For idealist thinkers, on the other hand, the world could and should be seen in a progressive manner, and the task is to make it a better place for all. It can be assumed that this ‘great’ moral/normative debate between realism and idealism is the core of the world government idea(l). As for domestic politics, populism as a political strategy and discourse, which is also reflected upon the uncooperative foreign policies of the states, is said to have global ramifications, since it serves and strengthens the realist view in question that states ought to maximize their power at all costs. For example, some populist leaders tend to evaluate global issues from such a narrow standpoint that leads to even deny the climate change or refuse to cooperate in tackling with this sort of issues while some democratic leaders like ex-PM G. Brown calls for a temporary world government to overcome Covid-19 pandemic. In this paper, the idea(l) of world government is argued in relation to ever-globalizing state of world problems and politics, and populism is conceptualised as a domestic and international barrier to a global solution/state idea regarding the tensions between democracy and populism in national politics and to the rivalry between idealism and realism in international order.

This paper will contribute to the debate about the causes of contemporary contestation of the liberal international order (LIO) by right-wing authoritarian populists. The study will focus primarily on international institutions. Unlike most IR theories that see the sources of contestation of LIO as exogenous, similarly to Borzel and Zurn (2021, 825) we identify them as endogenous. In contrast to those authors, however, we show that they correlate mainly with the values represented by different institutions, rather than with their postnational, intrusive features. The quantitative analysis developed in the paper shows which values represented by international institutions are particularly contested by contemporary populists.