Conference Program

New Medievalism (NM) is a conception of world order defined as ‘the system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty’ (Bull, 1977). It frames the world order after globalization, the crisis of the modern state, and postmodern governance. It has become a ‘point of departure’ and a heuristics for analysing the consequences of globalization, European integration, postmodern world order, or non-state actors (Cerny, 2010; Zielonka, 2014; McFate, 2014; Collignon, 2017; Doboš, 2020). Yet, a comprehensive and holistic study that would help understand NM better is still missing. Existing literature is fragmented and scattered, including the critique of NM.

This paper discusses the main points of the book that responds to this challenge. The major question is: what NM is and what is its role in IR? The book argues that NM constitutes an intellectual manifestation of the unbounding of modernity in IR research. Specifically, NM is a conception of world order that creates a framework that, through its anti-modernity-centric perspective, contributes to the intellectual, spatial, temporal, and existential unbounding of the modern political imagination in IR. The ‘unbounding’ refers to the ‘bounding’ and ‘bonding’ of political space in the polity formation literature (Bartolini 2005; Vollaard 2018) and the concept of ‘unbundling’ of modern territoriality by Friedrich Kratochwil (1986) and John Ruggie (1993) in the context of postmodern transformation in world politics. In NM, the contestation of modern ideas and structures manifests in the contestation of state-centrism and presentism in IR, and in exposing modern insecurities.

Within a conventional reading of world politics, interstate competition prevents functional differentiation between states while domestically it forces them to claim and maintain sovereign prerogatives, not least to mobilize sufficient ressources for national defence purposes. Contrary to this assumption however, private corporations have been treated almost as co-rulers in world politics, even on matters of war and peace. Thus, in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, US officials treated Elon Musk, the owner of Starlink, a satellite-based internet service, as if he were a fellow state representative. Musk was likewise courted as a world leader by China during one of his recent ‚private‘ visits to the country.

This paper uses the case of Starlink to illustrate how interstate competition can actually foster a transformation towards a less state-centric international order. More specifically, it argues that geopolitical competition, under conditions of an increasingly networked world, led states to encourage and normalize corporate agency on matters of war and peace despite being irreconcilable with the idea of sovereign prerogaties. Taking a role-theoretical perspective, the paper zooms in on Musks role-taking during three international(ized) security crises – the crackdown on protests in Iran, the Russian invasion of Ukaine and escalation within the Middle East. It demonstrates how state representatives as significant others, and in pursuance of geopolitical agendas, confirmed or at least tolerated such role-taking. The study concludes by questioning the conditions under which corporate agency will thrive or decrease in the future.

The article observes a ‘densification’ of climate-related societal engagement, climate action resources and repertoires, which amounts to a ‘climatisation’ of global governance. It argues that this deserves attention for a descriptive and an analytical reason: the first follows from the fact that densification has occurred in the global climate governance space; the second follows from a juxtaposition with the literature on political integration beyond the nation-state. They highlight the puzzling notion that, different from the interplay between institution building and political integration in the 1960s current institution-building is marked by densification without integration. The article engages this puzzle by asking where to analytically allocate densification? Section one presents the puzzle. Section two details the observation of societal interactions and fragmented institution-building beyond international organisations in global climate governance – analytically dubbed as ‘beyond the beyond’. Section three studies social drivers of a global low-carbon transformation illustrated by a vignette on company practices. The article concludes that densification appears as ‘strong’ climatization caused by bottom-up dynamics generating climate action resources, scripts and repertoires, and the institutionalization of linkages between social processes. These progressively coalesce into broader patterns of change, in which climatisation becomes increasingly irreversible.

The concept of actoral multiplicity in International Relations has shed new light on the discussion on the role and activities of non-state actors (NSAs) in world politics. NSAs are diverse - from highly formalized and hierarchical, such as international corporations, to informal and horizontal, like civil society organizations, social movements, and activists.

Civil society organizations, social movements and activists willing to conduct their campaigns and fulfil their ends are compelled to cooperate with different stakeholders. Therefore, the network seems to be a "natural" ecosystem for organizing their cooperation.

This observation raises several questions. The beneficial effects of cooperation as an activist network are marked, but how is the network limiting them in interactions? What challenges do participants in activist networks face in their cooperation?

The paper aims to answer these questions by examining the climate activist networks in Poland. They were selected for the analysis due to two main reasons. First, different types of NSAs are generally highly incorporated into the international climate regime and have a visible role in framing this structure. However, climate activists in Poland face many challenges in their actions. The networks have to overcome social reluctance, the opportunities for cooperation are limited, and the tradition of climate activism is fragile. Second, Poland is a member of the EU - the regional organization prominently engaged in global climate policy. Yet, Polish society, located in a post-communist country traditionally based on the coal industry, has difficulties in unreservedly accepting climate responsibilities and expectations.