Conference Program

After Putin became president in 2000, Russia's foreign policy went through several important changes, most of which were caused by the domestic political and economic situation. During Putin's first term, pragmatism was the main idea of his foreign policy. During Putin's second term, the domestic economic situation gradually improved, and his personal political power became more stable due to the introduction of powerful “Siloviki” in government departments, and his foreign policy gradually changed. After the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, Russia adopted a gradually tougher foreign policy. When Putin returned to power in 2012, returning to the status of a great power became his important goal, and Russia’s foreign policy turned to a nationalist foreign policy. During the Crimea incident in 2014 and the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, although Russia faced condemnation and sanctions from countries around the world, it still insisted on not changing its foreign behavior.

In October 2023, the Israel-Hamas conflict broke out. Russia abandoned the long-standing delicate Russia-Israel relations and supported Hamas along with Iran and China, while the United States and Europe supported Israel. Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia's foreign policy has been characterized by opportunism. The main purpose of this article is to observe Russia's foreign behavior in the background of the current Russian-Ukrainian war and the Israel-Hamas conflict, and analyze its opportunistic diplomatic actions, identify the characteristics of these actions and lay the foundation for future comparative research.

In recent years, India has been actively engaged in multilateral diplomacy, participating in various micro-multilateral mechanisms such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Group of Twenty (G20). However, these groups possess distinct attributes and, in certain instances, they may even be mutually exclusive regarding specific issues. It is worthwhile to investigate how India manages to maintain equilibrium among these groups against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This study aims to focus on the BRICS group, which are also highly anticipated by India, by using the “group member role” theory. Regarding the role of leader, India and China are competing for leadership at the BRCIS to fill the power vacuum left after Russia's decline. China promotes the BRICS plus model; India wants to be the voice of Global South. India worries that Russia's increasing dependence on China will lead to China becoming a monopoliser in the group. As a reformer/revisionist in the group, India attempts to downplay anti-US and anti-Western sentiments within the group while China prefers to build an anti-US coalition. With Russia’s military with Ukraine continuing, Russia is not able to play a functional coordinator at the group and a harmonizer in the China-India disagreement. With the decline of Russia's power due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India will be more cautious of China's efforts to leverage the BRICS mechanism for expanding its influence.

Being geographically situated in Asia and Europe, Taiwan and Lithuania, despite their relatively small landmass and population sizes, both confront external power dynamics. This paper adopts a perspective from the standpoint of small states, aiming to elucidate the strategic choices and responses of such nations when faced with intensified great power competition. In the context of escalating power rivalry, the paper posits that as the space for hedging diminishes, smaller nations are incentivized to adopt more assertive diplomatic approaches to secure support from dominant powers perceived as amicable. Using Taiwan and Lithuania as case studies, the study aims to uncover the rationale behind their choices to either engage in or refrain from hedging strategies. The comparative analysis sheds light on the distinct factors influencing risk mitigation decisions in diverse geopolitical contexts, providing valuable insights into the nuanced dynamics of small state behavior in an era marked by intensified global power competition.

The study of grand strategy usually takes the case of the United States as an example, in which grand strategy is defined as a consistent approach adopted by the state with coordinated resources to pursue national goals. The US strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet during the Cold War, dubbed as containment policy, helped the former achieve the hegemonic status in world politics.

Nevertheless, China's rise shaped the US grand strategy from head to toe and ended the US engagement with China through Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden. This paper begins with US definition of national interest from the Obama to Biden administration and explores how the redefinition of national interest resulted in the change of priorities in foreign policy. China’s growing capabilities and lack of transparency contributed to the increase in threat perception, and the US saw China as a challenge rather than a partner. After examining the US perception of China, this paper aims to answer the following two questions: What are the possible choices and alternatives for the US? To what extent would this possible new grand strategy shape China’s behavior?

After reviewing how China is described in the National Security Strategy in recent years, we see that the changing images of China over time did have an impact on how the US chose to respond to the threats. How Biden's grand strategy is formulated, and its implications for the international order will be crucial points for further research.