Conference Program

As global power structures undergo transformation, states are adapting their diplomatic strategies to navigate the evolving landscape. The paper investigates how changing power dynamics are compelling traditional pattern of multilateralism to take a shift to minilateralism. Traditional structures of global cooperation which is epitomized by United Nations and its sub structures are facing challenges to deal with contemporary issues. Such milieu has given rise diverse trends at global level by already existing powers and the emerging powers. Here, the variables that have fueled this development, such as changes in geopolitical power dynamics, technology advancements, and the complexity of today's global issues.

Currently, emerging powers, like China has demonstrated a strong commitment to multilateralism in line with its rise to prominence in the world economy. Examples which includes its active engagement in international organizations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). At the same time, withdrawal from multilateral treaties, pursuance of self-interest and practice of protectionism can be taken as stepping down from global responsibilities. Along with withdrawal, minilateralism is being practiced through QUAD, AUKUS. The study explores the ways in which the global governance milieu is impacted by China's multilateral approach and the contrasting tendency of US minilateral.

The paper investigates how the principles of Realism and Constructivism offer insights into the motivations behind the embrace of minilateralism and multilateralism by states seeking to secure their interests in an increasingly competitive international arena.

The paper will be devoted to development aid as an instrument of foreign policy based on a case study of the activities of three states – Australia, New Zealand and China, and will be placed in the context of the clash of different visions of the international order.

All these states are involved in the Pacific islands, which need broadly understood development support – in the form of financial flows, programmatic and technical assistance. Each of these state has different motives and goals, and uses different instruments, with Australia and New Zealand often cooperating with each other, and China being their most serious rival in gaining the trust of the island states.

For example, while Australia’s aid is conditioned by the desire to strengthen the position as a peaceful regional power, and New Zealand’s is influenced by its developing Pacific identity or an attempt to control island crises so that they do not spill over directly to New Zealand – China uses development aid to build loyalty and influence, and, consequently, most likely, construct military bases.

The speaker will first characterize development aid as an instrument of foreign policy in general, then present the activities of each of the selected states: their conditions, goals, formal basis and manifestations, identify the strengths and weaknesses, and determine the importance of these activities for the foreign policies of Australia, New Zealand and China. Then she will characterize the similarities and differences in the approaches of these states and explain what they result from.

Following Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the EU sees Russia as the primary threat to its security. While some have framed the war as a clash between democracy and autocracy, others perceive it in “north-south terms”, suggesting a certain Western fatigue among the “rest”. Russia did not only invade a sovereign state, it attacked the foundational principles of the post-World War II order in a sign of intensifying authoritarian revisionism, and has received valuable diplomatic support from China. International debates have intensified as to whether a movement towards a new order has started. Russia and China have both tried to position themselves as solution providers to the problems of the so-called Global South. Beijing has claimed it supports the aspects of the Westphalian order centred on sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference and self-determination, but not elements of the liberal international order, namely shared sovereignty, rule of law, the international promotion of human rights and the US alliance system. Supported by Moscow, Beijing has been leading the authoritarian pushback against institutions supporting human rights, with information manipulation as a key tool to impose its alternative. This paper maintains that questions remain as to whether China’s efforts to impose its alternative as superior to the “West” have been effective in the Global South. It studies Beijing’s narrative through its initiatives to impose its alternative governance model. It then explores perceptions in the Global South on one hand of the existing order and on the other, of the authoritarian alternative.

At the end of its 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg (2023), Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and Iran were announced as new permanent members of BRICS since January 2024. According to BRICS scholars the new format not only modernized and galvanized the grouping but also opened a gate to more substantial changes. One of them stems from voicing growing disenchantment with the prevailing international system that leads to the adoption of guiding principles, standards, and procedures which have potentially made the BRICS a more attractive institution for consensus-building and dialogue in the developing world. The second change is related to the BRICS quest for global influence. The third potential change is built upon growing BRICS as an attractive alternative to the Western order highlighting multipolarity, multilateralism, and the practice of Ubuntu based on the understanding that success, prosperity and well-being of BRICS members depend on the success, prosperity and well-being of others.

In this paper, I will emphasize the role of the BRICS as a necessary puzzle piece for the appreciation of the Global South agency. By highlighting the evolution of BRICS, this paper will contribute to the discussion about the contagious, convergent and cumulative cooperation of a few rising powers seeking to separate themselves from the cluster of countries that Miles Kahler terms the incumbents in global governance and push Global South countries to build a countervailing institution that explicitly distanced themselves from the same G7 countries, and punctuated their self-image as outsiders.