Conference Agenda

Standard hedonic housing price regressions may be mis-specified. They impose that

neighborhood amenities and quality characteristics affect prices proportionately. In

contrast, we suggest that neighborhood amenities may be capitalized via a two-part

tariff: an extensive margin “ticket” to enter a community as well as an intensive margin

price per unit of housing services. A theoretical model shows that extensive margin

pricing will emerge when there are binding restrictions on the number of housing units.

Using data on housing transactions across U.S. urban markets, we show that twopart

pricing is ubiquitous and especially pronounced in markets with high regulation

and an older housing stock. Two-part pricing is relevant for hedonic estimation of

local amenities: in particular, ignoring it will understate the willingness to pay of

poorer households.

We study the heterogeneity in preferences regarding the limited substitutability of environmental public goods versus private consumption and how it affects the economic value of nature. We show theoretically how mean marginal willingness to pay (WTP) depends on the distribution of complementarity preferences, and that it increases in preference heterogeneity. We provide a sufficient statistic for the contribution of preference heterogeneity to mean WTP and derive heterogeneity-equivalent representative agent preferences. We subsequently introduce an experimental framework to elicit individual-level complementarity preferences directly, applying it to incentivized and hypothetical trade-offs between market goods and forest ecosystem services. Estimating preference parameters for a large general population sample, we document substantial preference heterogeneity. The majority of estimates imply a preference for complementarity, with a median elasticity of complementarity of around 2.5, and a heavy long tail. We illustrate how accounting for the heterogeneity in complementarity preferences may considerably increase the economic value of nature.

Information-based interventions are commonly proposed to promote sustainable consumption, yet their effectiveness may depend on how individuals dynamically process attributes during decision making. This paper examines how climate-change information—specifically ocean acidification (OA)—affects seafood preferences through attentional dynamics rather than static shifts in utility. We use a Random Utility Maximization–Decision Field Theory (RUM-DFT) framework, which integrates discrete choice modeling with psychological process models to explicitly capture sequential attention allocation and time-dependent preference formation. The empirical application relies on a stated-preference choice experiment on bivalve seafood products, where respondents were randomly assigned to an OA information treatment or a control group, generating 7,524 choice observations from 627 individuals. We estimate RUM-DFT models under alternative deliberation-time bounds to identify how information affects both attention shares and implied preference parameters over the course of the decision process. Results show that OA information produces a transient increase in attention toward environmentally relevant credence attributes during early deliberation, but these effects weaken—and can reverse—when deliberation time extends, with attention progressively concentrating on perceptually salient attributes such as visual appearance. These patterns support an attribute latency mechanism in which perceptual and abstract information enter evidence accumulation at different stages. The findings imply that climate information does not induce stable preference changes; instead, it modifies choice outcomes through temporally evolving attention processes that static random utility models cannot recover. Policy implications emphasize that effective sustainability interventions should go beyond information provision and focus on attention management via salience-enhancing designs, simplified metrics, and decision architectures that prevent cognitive overload.

The paper analyzes a Stackelberg differential game between a leading

social-welfare-maximizer regulator and a follower profit-maximizer pol-

luting firm. Regulation is implemented by a tax on emissions plus a

fine for misreporting. The firm chooses the emissions and the reported

amount, and therefore the evasion, to maximize profits net of taxes and

fines. The firm has a green reputation, which evolves according to the

reaction of environmentally concerned consumers to the firm’s behavior.

Informed consumers penalize misreporting, while uninformed consumers

reward low reported emissions, since they falsely signal firm’s greenness,

an effect interpreted as the firm’s greenwashing. Interestingly, credibility

on and response strength to this signal by uninformed consumers raises

greenwashing, which improves the firm’s green reputation, the consumers’

willingness to pay, and social welfare. This comes together with a higher

tax and a better environment. Similarly, a higher share of informed con-

sumers, by inducing a tax reduction, reduces fraud, thereby improving

the firm’s green reputation and, in turn, social welfare, although at the

expense of a worse environment.