Conference Agenda

We extend the classical discrete time great fish war game to a stochastic framework in which random shocks determine the reproduction capabilities of the resource and the probability of shock realizations depends on the resource stock. We allow the probability of the most adverse shock realization to either decrease or increase with the resource stock to represent the specific biological and ecological characteristics of the resource related to whether risk buffer or risk amplification mechanisms are predominant. We show that both under noncooperation and cooperation harvesting choices are directly affected by uncertainty, and when the probability function is decreasing (increasing) the harvesting policy prescribes a larger (smaller) preservation of the fish stock than in the absence of uncertainty. This suggests that a precautionary approach to resource management is actually desirable only when the probability function is decreasing. We also characterize the features of the invariant resource distribution the economy converges to in the long run, analyzing how the properties of the probability function affect the invariant distribution in the noncooperative and cooperative frameworks. Even if cooperation leads to a rightward shift in its support, whether cooperation leads the distribution to concentrate more mass towards larger or smaller resource stock values depends on the nature of the probability function. This suggests that effective resource policies should be specifically designed to account for the biological and ecological peculiarities of different resources

This paper develops a dynamic model of natural resource management under uncertainty about spatial migration patterns. We consider a renewable resource, such as a fish stock, distributed across two spatial patches, where non-cooperative harvesters face uncertainty about self-retention and dispersal rates. Harvesters update beliefs over time by observing stock levels, actively learning through escapement decisions. Learning introduces two behavioral forces: a learning effect, which encourages reduced extraction to gain information, and a flexibility effect, which pushes for increased extraction to hedge against future disutility. Their interaction shapes optimal experimentation and strategic harvester behavior. Without learning, harvesters tend to mirror each other, but with learning, one harvester’s choices may lead the other to do the opposite—extracting less when the other extracts more—due to informational spillovers with learning through experimenting. In a cooperative setting, coordinated

learning can result in higher total extraction than under non-cooperative behavior, challenging conventional wisdom from the tragedy of the commons. These findings offer novel insights for designing adaptive management strategies in contexts where spatial dynamics and uncertain resource mobility are critical.

Collective action for managing the world’s ocean fisheries relies on cooperative agreements that establish regional fisheries management organizations or RFMOs. I show that an RFMO can sustain full cooperation only for fisheries shared by n≤4 countries. For n ≥ 5, parties to a fisheries agreement continue to adopt the full cooperative effort level, with non-parties applying more effort on top of this. Increasing n from four to five causes rents to fall abruptly. As n→∞, participation approaches n/2, and rents vanish. For values of n in the range of today’s RFMO-managed fisheries, rents are positive but only because they would be positive in the absence of an RFMO. I then study what an RFMO could achieve under a hypothetical regime in which the right to fish on the high seas, established in customary law since the early 17th century, is made conditional on participation in the relevant RFMO. Under this regime, full cooperation can be sustained for n≤9. As n increases from 9 to 10 and beyond, rents fall but remain significantly higher than under today’s regime (four times higher as n→∞). Finally, I show that this hypothetical regime can be sustained as an equilibrium in customary law. My model thus predicts that it should be possible to change today’s rules of the game of high seas fishing so as to attenuate, though not eliminate, the tragedy of the ocean commons worldwide.

This paper demonstrates how emission permit trading systems, with strategically designed initial allocations, can simultaneously balance the competing goals of economic efficiency, distributional equity, and coalition stability. We develop a novel theoretical framework that embeds participation constraints into the welfare optimization problem, ensuring countries voluntarily join a coalition.

Using numerical simulation results of a RICE type of integrated assessment model, including climate-induced capital depreciation and total factor productivity growth losses, we determine welfare maximizing initial allocations of permits that address participation constraints and equity concerns.

Our findings demonstrate that carefully designed permit allocations can sustain stable international cooperation while preserving climate ambitions.

The welfare maximizing permit allocations exhibit a distinct temporal pattern directing permits earlier in time to vulnerable, low-income regions (notably Africa) and later to wealthier regions.