Conference Agenda

Stated preference (SP) methods are widely used to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP), yet concerns remain about hypothetical bias arising from strategic behavior and social desirability. This study examines how provision bias, a form of strategic behavior, and social desirability bias induced by public recognition, separately and jointly affect stated WTP for private goods with public good characteristics. We develop a conceptual framework that incorporates the provision of a good and public recognition into individual utility and test corresponding hypotheses in a framed field experiment. We find no evidence of provision bias. Public recognition increases WTP primarily among individuals with higher values, while the joint effect of provision bias and SDB is positive but statistically insignificant. These findings increase confidence in the use of SP methods for eliciting WTP for private goods and draw attention to accounting for recognition effects in survey design.

For centuries, pastoralism in Mongolia has been sustained through the shared use of communal grasslands. However, rapid urban-centered economic development has raised concerns about the sustainability of this cooperative system and its ecological consequences, driven by the increasing concentration of pastoralists in peri-urban areas and the diffusion of market-oriented norms. Traditionally, communal land management has relied on voluntary cooperation rooted in local social norms, rather than on formal sanctions or monetary incentives. This study examines how urban economic development affects cooperative relationships among pastoralists. Exploiting variation in proximity to urban centers as a proxy for exposure to urban economic influence, we analyze how urban proximity and population pressure shape voluntary contributions to the management of common resources. We conducted public goods game experiments with 150 groups, comprising 600 herders across five regions of Mongolia, and employed econometric methods to analyze cooperative behavior. The results indicate that proximity to urban centers is significantly negatively associated with cooperation, whereas higher population density is positively correlated with voluntary contributions. Moreover, high contribution levels were sustained through simple rule explanations alone, without the use of sanctions or incentives commonly employed in behavioral economics experiments. These findings suggest that cooperation in communal resource management can be reinforced by social interaction but may erode as traditional norms weaken under urban influence. Cooperation can persist even in contexts where sanctions or incentives are difficult to implement, underscoring the importance of context-specific policy design for common-pool resource governance.

One-time policy interventions have been tested to reduce food waste extensively. However, their limitations underscore the need for a more advanced, sequenced policy design that engages citizens as participants in the behaviour change process to help solve the problem of excessive food waste. In this study, we test the effectiveness of two behavioural interventions sequenced together using a step-wedged design, namely, a nudge with or without a thinking prompt, in reducing food waste and generating financial savings. 193 households in Fife Council, Scotland participated in a pre-registered field experiment spanning across 8 weeks (N=1081). All households completed pre- and post-experiment questionnaires and reported actual food waste and grocery bills. In week 3, participants were randomised into a control or a nudge group. The nudge arm received a feedback report comparing the average household food waste with the other participants. In weeks 4 \& 5, the control arm received the feedback report while the nudge group was further encouraged by phone or text to think about strategies that reduce food waste (nudge+). Treatments were withdrawn starting week 6. Both interventions significantly reduced household food waste compared to the baseline, on average. The nudge+ additionally reduced 10g of food waste per household versus the nudge (ns), with a significant lagged effect in the post-treatment period. Planning, storage skills and good disposal attitudes increased after the experiment, without any meaningful financial savings generated. Policy sequencing can improve the effectiveness of behavioural interventions in reducing food waste.

Polarization between different groups has increasingly become a problem in many societies, with polarization often also reflected in views and behavior on environmental issues. In this paper, we examine how discrimination between groups arises under different punishment institutions and affects cooperation. We use experimental public goods games with two different punishment institutions to examine intergroup bias in second-party punishment decisions. To manipulate group membership, students from two different universities either play the game with a member of their own university (‘in-group’) or with a member of the other university (‘out-group’). The first punishment institution allows players to choose their contributions to the public good and then to punish the other player after seeing the contributions (‘altruistic punishment’). The second punishment institution allows players to set the punishment in advance for each possible combination of contributions and then to choose the contributions after seeing the other player’s punishment strategy (‘strategic punishment’). The results reveal significant intergroup bias in altruistic punishment, consistent with previous studies. In contrast, strategic punishment of in-group members and out-group members for the same contribution to the public good is almost identical. We discuss the reasons for this difference in discrimination and the implications for the design of institutions to regulate social interactions.