Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Egg-Timer: Political Economy of Environmental Policy Location: D-112 Session Chair: Massimo Tavoni, Politecnico di Milano e EIEE | |
| Presentation 4 | |
Public Support for Universal Road Pricing 1: Institute of Transport Economics (TØI), Norway; 2: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; 3: Oslo Metropolititan University and ETH Zürich; 4: Universidad Complutense de Madrid Distance-based road pricing can internalize driving externalities and provide fiscally sustainable infrastructure financing as vehicle electrification erodes fuel tax revenues. Yet, political resistance may pose a barrier to implementation. We provide the first comprehensive analysis of preferences for universal road pricing using a stated choice experiment with nearly 4,000 Norwegian respondents. Policy alternatives vary systematically across urban peak prices, off-peak prices, nonurban prices, electric vehicle prices, and revenue allocation. We document robust majority support (70% to 80%) for most universal road pricing schemes, substantially exceeding typical support for local congestion charges. Support varies by design: public transport earmarking outperforms general budget allocation by 8 percentage points, while moderate pricing dominates high pricing by 5 to 7 points. Support varies substantially with car use, availability of transport alternatives, and institutional trust, but shows little sensitivity to income, urban residence, or toll exposure. Latent class analysis identifies unconditional supporters (57%), systematic opponents (22%), and a persuadable middle (21%). Randomized information treatments generate modest effects, with factual information increasing support by 6 percentage points. Political barriers to road pricing may be lower than assumed with moderate pricing and credible infrastructure earmarking. | |

