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Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 24th Aug 2026, 01:49:27am WEST

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Daily Overview

Session

Fossil Fuel Energy Resource Markets
Location: D-104
Session Chair: Aart de Zeeuw, Tilburg University

Presentation 4

Solving Nash Equilibria in Nonlinear Differential Games for Common-Pool Resources

Yongyang Cai¹, Anastasios Xepapadeas^2,3, Aart de Zeeuw^4,5

1: The Ohio State University, USA; 2: University of Bologna, Italy; 3: Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece; 4: Tilburg University, the Netherlands; 5: Beijer Institute for Ecological Economics, Sweden

Discussant: Gerard van der Meijden (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Many resources are provided by ecological systems that are vulnerable to a sudden big loss of ecosystem services when exceeding a certain level of pollution. This leads to non-convexities in managing ecological systems. An ecological system is often also a common-pool resource and therefore vulnerable to suboptimal use resulting from non-cooperative behavior. An analysis requires methods to derive cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in managing these types of ecological systems. Such a game is a differential game that has two well-defined non-cooperative solutions, the open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria. This paper provides new numerical methods for solving open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, for one dimensional and multiple-dimensional systems. The methods are applied to the lake game, which is the classical example for these types of problems. Especially, the two-dimensional feedback Nash equilibria for the lake game are a novelty of this paper. Such a Nash equilibrium can be close to the cooperative solution which has important policy implications.