Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Climate Change Mitigation 5 Location: B011 Session Chair: Joshua Bißbort, RPTU Kaiserslautern | |
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A Mechanism for Addressing Participation and Compliance for the Provision of Global Public Goods University of Graz, Austria In a three-stage global public good coalition formation game, Kornek and Edenhofer (2020) propose a transfer scheme in the spirit of mechanism design which allows to stabilize large coalitions, including the grand coalition. The transfer scheme addresses the free-rider problem in terms of participation. In order to address the free-rider problem in terms of compliance with transfer obligations, they propose a deposit-refund scheme in the spirit of Gerber and Wichardt (2009) and others. However, McEvoy and McGinty (2023) argue in a comment that the compliance issue has not yet been solved because signatories would have neither an incentive to pay the deposit nor the transfer. Therefore, in this paper, we divide the entire game into four stages and demonstrate in detail that compliance is an equilibrium strategy for each decision in the game. Subsequently, we argue that the game can be simplified by merging stages. We also demonstrate that the transfer scheme retains its desirable properties by considering asymmetric countries. It emerges that it is promising to generalize further the setting of Kornek and Edenhofer (2020). | |