Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 24th Aug 2026, 01:53:40am WEST
External resources will be made available 30 min before a session starts. You may have to reload the page to access the resources.
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
Energy Demand and Efficiency 1 Location: B132 Session Chair: Geert Goeyvaerts, KU Leuven | |
    | |
Self-Selection in Retail Electricity Contracts: Competition, Regulation, and Welfare Implications 1: Aalto University, Finland; 2: IAE Nantes, Nantes University We study equilibrium contract adoption in retail electricity markets in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay over time and can choose between a fixed-price contract (FP) and real-time pricing contract (RTP). Self-selection alters the consumption profile and, in turn, the cost of serving FP customers, creating an adverse-selection channel with endogenous costs. In a competitive retail segment, this channel unravels the FP contract: any private retailer that attracts FP customers is left with a pool that is too costly to serve at break-even. Under a regulated monopoly offering the FP contract, contract choice instead disciplines pricing: the monopoly internalizes consumer sorting to the RTP contract and may cut its price to retain low-cost customers. This pricing response can increase inefficient peak consumption and reduce welfare relative to a benchmark without an RTP contract. We characterize the monopoly’s pricing rule, show how consumer heterogeneity governs the strength of the sorting incentive, and discuss regulatory instruments (two-part tariffs and loss-financing rules) that mitigate the welfare cost of opt-in RTP contracts. | |