Conference Agenda

Fisheries face two distinct market failures: the well-documented "race-to-fish" problem of resource overexploitation, and the less studied problem of price depression from uncoordinated landing timing. When vessels arrive at port simultaneously, concentrated landings overwhelm processing capacity and depress ex-vessel prices—a form of rent dissipation that persists even under quantity-based management systems. We investigate whether coordinating landing timing can mitigate this temporal market failure. Using a structural auction model, we analyze Japan's Kesennuma offshore longline fishery, which implemented coordinated landing schedules following the 2011 tsunami. Using transaction-level data from swordfish auctions spanning 2009-2019, structural estimation reveals that bidder valuations respond significantly to landing timing, with longer intervals between landings associated with higher prices. Counterfactual simulations demonstrate that landing coordination generates approximately 1% higher auction prices—modest but statistically significant efficiency gains without reducing total supply. These findings provide first empirical evidence that simple institutional coordination can address temporal market failures, complementing quantity-based management tools.