Conference Agenda
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Daily Overview |
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International Agreements Location: D-104 Session Chair: Sarah Spycher, ETH Zurich | |
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Lineages of International Environmental Agreements 1: University of Durham, United Kingdom; 2: University of Bordeaux, France We analyze "lineages" of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), defined as sets of protocols and amendments that modify or extend the original agreement. Technically, we integrate multilateral bargaining with endogenous outside options into a gradual coalition-formation process. Focusing on pure strategies, the multiplicity of equilibria in the one-shot game is exacerbated, yielding multiple potential paths of gradual coalition formation. However, the outcome of the process can be determined: a small coalition if coalitions are reversible, the grand coalition if they are irreversible, and intermediate coalition sizes when they are partially reversible. The distribution of the surplus within the coalition converges to the Nash Bargaining Solution in some equilibria but, unexpectedly, not in all. Considering gradual coalition formation and completely mixed strategies yields a unique equilibrium path, implying a slow expansion of the coalition. Along all equilibrium paths, the coalition gradually expands in the number of participants and the ambition per participant, two features observed in many lineages of IEA. | |