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Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 24th Aug 2026, 01:52:49am WEST

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Daily Overview

Session

Monitoring, Enforcement and Compliance
Location: B004
Session Chair: Mengdi Liu, University of International Business and Economics

Presentation 2

Refundable deposits and the adoption of biodegradable fishing gear: An experimental investigation

Huu-Luat Do¹, Todd Cherry², Caleb Hill², David McEvoy³

1: University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam; 2: University of Wyoming; 3: Appalachian State University

Discussant: Yifan Chen (National University of Singapore)

Voluntary adoption of sustainable practices is essential for addressing environmental problems such as marine pollution and ghost fishing caused by abandoned, lost, or discarded fishing gear (ALDFG). Yet sustaining compliance within voluntary agreements remains a key challenge. This study uses laboratory experiments to assess refundable deposit mechanisms that promote the adoption of biodegradable fishing gear. Participants were assigned to one of four treatments: a baseline with no agreement, a no-deposit agreement, an agreement with partially deterrent deposits, and an agreement with fully deterrent deposits. Agreements formed only if a minimum participation threshold was met, and deposits were refunded only when members fulfilled their commitments. Results reveal a trade-off between participation and compliance: no-deposit agreements form more frequently but yield lower adoption. Deposit-refund mechanisms improve compliance and adoption, with the fully deterrent deposit treatment performing best, particularly among large players. These findings underscore the importance of incentive-compatible enforcement in designing effective voluntary environmental programs.