Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
| Session | |
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Fossil Fuel Energy Resource Markets Location: D-104 Session Chair: Aart de Zeeuw, Tilburg University | |
| Presentation 3 | |
Market power: A powerful motive for mergers in extractive industries 1: McGill University; 2: Beijing Normal University; 3: University of Winnipeg We examine firms' incentives to acquire rivals in an effort to monopolize an exhaustible resource sector when the acquisition price is endogenous. Firms compete in quantities: each entity chooses its extraction policy, i.e. a Markovian strategy that allows extraction rate to depend on the vector of stocks. When firms' stocks are sufficiently small, in contrast to either the static or open loop Cournot cases, monopolization is a profitable strategy. The gains from monopolization are a non-monotonic function of demand elasticity. We also show that a carbon tax may deter monopolization and thereby speed up the extraction of fossil fuels. | |

