Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Climate Change Mitigation 6: Carbon Border Adjustments Location: B011 Session Chair: Robin Sogalla, University of Mannheim and Kiel Institute for the World Economy | |
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Carbon Taxes, Carbon Border Adjustments, and the World Trade Organization 1: UC Berkeley, United States of America; 2: Dartmouth, United States of America; 3: Stanford Graduate School of Business, United States of America Can carbon taxes and associated carbon border adjustments (CBAs) respect existing agreements in international trade while significantly reducing pollution from carbon emissions? This paper answers this question in the context of a quantitative trade-and-emissions model for both non-cooperative (Nash) and cooperative (international negotiation with participation constraints) carbon tax setting. We find that a climate agreement that deviates from the usual design of uniform carbon taxes applied across its members and instead entertains the possibility of country-specific carbon taxes as a means of addressing participation constraints can achieve substantial reductions in worldwide emissions and offer a meaningful WTO-consistent alternative to the climate clubs described by Nordhaus (2015) that confront non-participants with the threat of WTO-inconsistent Nash tariff punishments. And we find that the design of CBAs permitted by the WTO can impact the degree of worldwide carbon reduction and welfare improvements in important ways. In particular, our findings suggest that optimal WTO rules on permissible CBAs will evolve with the evolving success of international cooperation over climate policy. | |