Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Daily Overview |
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Behavioral Insights and Biases in Resource Cooperation Location: B128 Session Chair: Astrid Dannenberg, University of Kassel | |
| Presentation 2 | |
Is cooperation for grassland conservation possible under economic development? A public goods experiment with Mongolian herders 1: Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences, Japan; 2: Mongolian University of Life Sciences For centuries, pastoralism in Mongolia has been sustained through the shared use of communal grasslands. However, rapid urban-centered economic development has raised concerns about the sustainability of this cooperative system and its ecological consequences, driven by the increasing concentration of pastoralists in peri-urban areas and the diffusion of market-oriented norms. Traditionally, communal land management has relied on voluntary cooperation rooted in local social norms, rather than on formal sanctions or monetary incentives. This study examines how urban economic development affects cooperative relationships among pastoralists. Exploiting variation in proximity to urban centers as a proxy for exposure to urban economic influence, we analyze how urban proximity and population pressure shape voluntary contributions to the management of common resources. We conducted public goods game experiments with 150 groups, comprising 600 herders across five regions of Mongolia, and employed econometric methods to analyze cooperative behavior. The results indicate that proximity to urban centers is significantly negatively associated with cooperation, whereas higher population density is positively correlated with voluntary contributions. Moreover, high contribution levels were sustained through simple rule explanations alone, without the use of sanctions or incentives commonly employed in behavioral economics experiments. These findings suggest that cooperation in communal resource management can be reinforced by social interaction but may erode as traditional norms weaken under urban influence. Cooperation can persist even in contexts where sanctions or incentives are difficult to implement, underscoring the importance of context-specific policy design for common-pool resource governance. | |

