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Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 24th Aug 2026, 01:51:09am WEST

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Daily Overview

Session

Behavioral Insights and Biases in Resource Cooperation
Location: B128
Session Chair: Astrid Dannenberg, University of Kassel

Presentation 4

Intergroup Bias in Second-Party Punishment

Astrid Dannenberg, Pia Pico

University of Kassel, Germany

Discussant: Vic Adamowicz (University of Alberta)

Polarization between different groups has increasingly become a problem in many societies, with polarization often also reflected in views and behavior on environmental issues. In this paper, we examine how discrimination between groups arises under different punishment institutions and affects cooperation. We use experimental public goods games with two different punishment institutions to examine intergroup bias in second-party punishment decisions. To manipulate group membership, students from two different universities either play the game with a member of their own university (‘in-group’) or with a member of the other university (‘out-group’). The first punishment institution allows players to choose their contributions to the public good and then to punish the other player after seeing the contributions (‘altruistic punishment’). The second punishment institution allows players to set the punishment in advance for each possible combination of contributions and then to choose the contributions after seeing the other player’s punishment strategy (‘strategic punishment’). The results reveal significant intergroup bias in altruistic punishment, consistent with previous studies. In contrast, strategic punishment of in-group members and out-group members for the same contribution to the public good is almost identical. We discuss the reasons for this difference in discrimination and the implications for the design of institutions to regulate social interactions.