Conference Agenda
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Daily Overview |
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Common Pool Resource Management Location: D-106 Session Chair: Sumeet Gulati, University of British Columbia | |
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Exclusion and common pool resource management: Experimental evidence 1: Universidad de Talca, Chile; 2: University of Alaska-Anchorage; 3: University of Massachusetts-Amherst We report results from laboratory experiments examining common pool resource (CPR) management when group members could be excluded and excluded individuals could continue to extract from the resource through poaching. Endogenous exclusion created CPR “insiders” and excluded “outsiders,” introducing a boundary problem in which exclusion from the group does not automatically prevent access to the resource. We studied four treatments that varied whether insiders could expel group members, whether excluded individuals could poach from the resource, and whether poaching was deterred through enforcement. When exclusion was possible and poaching was prevented, insiders targeted less cooperative members for expulsion, total withdrawals fell, and insider earnings increased. Without enforcement, exclusion reduced insider withdrawals relative to the Baseline, but increased outsider extraction largely offset these reductions, so exclusion primarily reallocated extraction rather than substantially reducing total extraction. Introducing enforcement against poaching significantly reduced outsider extraction and partially restored the benefits of exclusion for insiders. The results show that ostracism can be an effective governance mechanism only when boundaries around the resource are enforced. | |