Conference Agenda

Large volumes of e-waste collected under formal schemes in high-income countries are still processed informally in developing ones, despite continuous policy efforts to reverse this trend. This paper shows that the persistence of informal e-waste processing is a consequence of how global waste flows interact with domestic market structure. I develop a two-country model in which a cost-minimizing broker exports low-value fractions of e-waste to a poorer country, where informal dismantlers and licensed recyclers compete to purchase material from local collectors. Because formal facilities face fixed-capacity costs, their competitiveness depends on achieving sufficiently high-value throughput. Low-value exports from the rich country increase total inflows but depress the effective high-value throughput and dilute domestic subsidies, keeping average costs high and allowing informal dismantlers to outbid formal recyclers. The model generates a formalization trap with multiple equilibria and explains why widely used policies, including per-unit subsidies, capital support, higher recycling targets in rich countries, and integration of informal collectors into formal systems, often fail to trigger a transition toward formal treatment.