Conference Agenda

We study the non-cooperative harvesting of a stochastic, mobile renewable natural resource where resource harvesters are risk-averse. We develop a stochastic bioeconomic model to analyze how strategic behavior may change under risk aversion. Contrary to previous literature assuming risk-neutral harvesters, we find that the harvester benefiting from dispersal may harvest more aggressively due to a `smoothing effect'. We apply our model to the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna fishery and find that risk aversion may mask efficiency losses associated with resource mobility. Our research highlights the significance of understanding the interplay between risk aversion and spatial dynamics in renewable resource management, demonstrating that interacting ecological and social factors can significantly alter the incentives for resource users.

Grasslands are the traditional example of the tragedy of the commons. In arid and semi-arid regions, this problem is even more severe as grasslands are susceptible to irreversible collapse. We study the common-pool resource problem in a two-state deterministic hydro-ecological model of a bistable dry grazing system, in which its pastoral inhabitants gain value through both livestock sales and livestock ownership. We solve the optimal control problem for a social planner and many atomistic agents managing the system. Atomistic agents cause an irreversible collapse under a wider range of parameters and reach a lower level of total welfare. We find that a tax on livestock restores the social optimum. We show however, that some level of cooperation between the pastoralists themselves to regulate land use, in the spirit of Ostrom (1990), also allows them to reach a stable steady state with a welfare level equal or close to the optimum. Additionally, we show that this collective action reinforces the resilience of the steady state, which underlines the sustainability of this practice.

We report results from laboratory experiments examining common pool resource (CPR) management when group members could be excluded and excluded individuals could continue to extract from the resource through poaching. Endogenous exclusion created CPR “insiders” and excluded “outsiders,” introducing a boundary problem in which exclusion from the group does not automatically prevent access to the resource. We studied four treatments that varied whether insiders could expel group members, whether excluded individuals could poach from the resource, and whether poaching was deterred through enforcement. When exclusion was possible and poaching was prevented, insiders targeted less cooperative members for expulsion, total withdrawals fell, and insider earnings increased. Without enforcement, exclusion reduced insider withdrawals relative to the Baseline, but increased outsider extraction largely offset these reductions, so exclusion primarily reallocated extraction rather than substantially reducing total extraction. Introducing enforcement against poaching significantly reduced outsider extraction and partially restored the benefits of exclusion for insiders. The results show that ostracism can be an effective governance mechanism only when boundaries around the resource are enforced.

We examine how political reservation affects environmental disaster relief. Using restricted-access data on human–wildlife conflict in the Himalayas, we find tribal communities face more conflict yet receive less compensation. Our model predicts minority leaders favor coethnics, reducing discrimination. Exploiting quasi-random variation from India’s reservation system, we show compensation per attack is higher and rises faster with tribal population share in tribal-led villages. This ethnic favoritism occurs because tribal claimants negotiate more effectively under coethnic leadership. Although overall conflict is lower under tribal leaders, welfare analysis shows tribal communities secure greater overall compensation, as representation helps navigate corruption and promotes fairness.