Conference Agenda

It is now widely recognized in the philosophy of technology that technology is not just a neutral means for realizing specific purposes. In the context of the numerous criticisms of an instrumentalist understanding of technology, there have also been conceptions that focus particularly on the actors involved in technical actions. In these approaches, the concept of a stable subject that exists independently of technology, which is prevalent in the context of instrumentalist conceptions of technology, is often replaced by the shaping of subjects in human-technology relations (locus classicus: Ihde 1990) or the co- constitution of subjects and objects within human-technology relations (e.g. Verbeek 2005, 2011) or of various types of interweaving and merging of humans and technology (e.g. Haraway, e.g. Haraway 1997, 2016 or Latour, e.g. Latour 1994, 2010, 2019).

Although these approaches fundamentally acknowledge the importance of the subject-theoretical dimension of human-technology relations, questions about the concrete contribution of technology to the constitution and forming of subjects, i.e. questions about the concrete technical contribution to so-called 'subjectification', remain surprisingly underdeveloped. The talk addresses this gap by proposing a perspective on technology as a dispositive, in the context of which the connection between technology and subjectification can also be grasped more precisely.

The talk first develops an understanding of technology as a dispositive of material-, intellectual- and social-technology, drawing on the concept of the dispositive in Michel Foucault (in particular Grosrichard et al. 2000, esp. pp. 119-125 and pp. 132-143) as well as on the cultural perspective on technology by Christoph Hubig (Hubig 2006, 2007, 11/16/2010), which is based on the ideas of Friedrich von Gottl-Ottilienfeld (Gottl-Ottlilienfeld 1923). It will then be shown that with regard to questions of subjectification, technology-dispositives understood in this way have a productive function, which conceptually is located in particular at the level of social-technology. Subsequently, this productive function of technology-dispositives is specified, i.a. on the basis of Foucault's remarks on self-constitution (in particular Foucault 2020, esp. pp. 36-45). Without reducing technology to a mere dispositive, a conceptual clarification of the character of technology as a dispositive is thus achieved, which also enables an analysis of the connection between technology and subjectification.

Finally, the discussion of the productive function of technology with regard to subjectification is illustrated with a view to the technology of so-called 'affective computing', in which technological control and optimization of interactions by emotion-sensitive and/or -active systems, as well as the general integration of emotional standards into social and economic structures, play a crucial role. On the basis of a concrete example, it is shown within this framework how, in the context of affective computing, not only the social communication or cooperation of technical systems and thus the smoothness, functionality, etc. of human-technology interactions is optimized, but also, for example with regard to phenomena such as emotional efficiency, emotional self-control or 'self-transparency', certain modes of subjectification and thus ultimately subject forms are re-configured.

References

- Foucault, Michel (2020): Der Gebrauch der Lüste. Sexualität und Wahrheit 2. 14. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

- Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Friedrich von (1923): Wirtschaft und Technik. 2., neubearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr.

- Grosrichard, Alain; Foucault, Michel; Wajeman, Gerard; Miller, Jaques-Alain; Le Gaufey, Guy; Miller, Gerard et al. (2000): Ein Spiel um die Psychoanalyse. Gespräch mit Angehörigen des Département de Psychanalyse der Universität Paris VIII in Vincennes. In: Michel Foucault: Dispositive der Macht. Über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit. Berlin: Merve Verl., pp. 118–175.

- Haraway, Donna (1997): Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM. Feminism and technoscience. New York, London: Routledge.

- Haraway, Donna (2016): Das Manifest für Gefährten. Wenn Spezies sich begegnen - Hunde, Menschen und signifikante Andersartigkeit. Berlin: Merve Verlag.

- Hubig, Christoph (2006): Die Kunst des Möglichen I. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

- Hubig, Christoph (2007): Die Kunst des Möglichen II. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

- Hubig, Christoph (2010): Vorlesung 'Technik als Kultur'. 4. Vorlesung. Technik als Kultur: Technisches Handeln und ein integratives Kulturkonzept, 11/16/2010.

- Ihde, Don (1990): Technology and the lifeworld. From garden to earth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Latour, Bruno (1994): On Technical Mediation. In Common Knowledge 3 (2), pp. 29–64.

- Latour, Bruno (2010): Das Parlament der Dinge. Für eine politische Ökologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

- Latour, Bruno (2019): Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue Gesellschaft. Einführung in die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie. 5. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

- Verbeek, Peter-Paul (2005): What things do. Philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design. 2. printing. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press.

- Verbeek, Peter-Paul (2011): Moralizing technology. Understanding and designing the morality of things. Chicago: Chicago UP.

…we are at least beginning to discover that there was a concealed catch in the original promise. The scientific ideology that made possible these colossal benefits, we now find, cannot be easily attached to other valid and purposeful human ends. In order to enjoy all these abundant goods, one must strictly conform to the dominant system, faithfully consuming all that it produces, meekly accepting its quantitative scale of values, never once demanding the most essential of all human goods, an ever more meaningful life, for that is precisely what automation, by its very nature and on its own strict premises, is utterly impotent to produce.

—Lewis Mumford (1964, p. 263)

In countless tiny creative actions, we remake our world in the name of a narrow conception of progress. The cumulative effect of these choices is a world where our behaviors are increasingly predicted, controlled, and optimized. We continue to fail, as a culture, to take seriously the claim that we eliminate valuable aspects of our experience in this accelerating process of rationalization.

I call this view “efficiency fundamentalism” and I outline several of its symptoms here. Representing a recent mutation of the Californian Ideology, efficiency fundamentalism is on full display especially in Silicon Valley (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). I draw upon several examples of emerging technologies that demonstrate this trend from there, including autonomous vehicles, the “Soylent” food substitute, Amazon’s fulfillment warehouses, online education, and the “life hacking” and “quantified self” movements. The observation has been made before that there exists a myopic obsession with efficiency, especially at the frontiers of technological development. But Silicon Valley in particular indulges this fetish with a new, unbridled extravagance.

Efficiency fundamentalism is characterized by: (1) the reverence for efficiency and optimization at the expense of other values; (2) the Procrustean quantification of holistic, ineffable experiences and practices; and (3) the elimination of what Jacques Ellul calls the “organic qualities” of a thing (Ellul, 1964, p. 135 ff).

In §1, I diagnose efficiency fundamentalism through the case of the Soylent food replacement, which illustrates its central features. In §2, I discuss several other examples of the practice and suggest what is specifically wrong with it is that it undermines our opportunities for authentic engagement with the world. In §3, I clarify these features and identify them in the case of the “quantified self” and “life hacking” movements, which represent the apotheosis of efficiency fundamentalism. By identifying these failures, my hope is that we might move beyond the obsession with efficiency to recapture some solace in a world increasingly subjected to the demands of quantification and optimization.

References

Barbrook, R., & Cameron, A. (1996). The Californian Ideology. Science as Culture, 44–72.

Ellul, J. (1964). The Technological Society. Toronto: Vintage Books.

Mumford, L. (1964). The Automation of Knowledge. AV Communication Review, 261–276.

This paper delves into the multifaceted ethical terrain of computational social science (CSS) research, examining both the descriptive and normative dimensions that shape ethical practices in this domain. The core aim is to investigate how ethical concerns are framed and operationalized within the CSS research community through intra-community norms and epistemic practices. Empirically, this involves exploring how researchers navigate complex ethical issues, such as privacy, fairness, and transparency (highlighted in works such as (Leslie, 2023; Salganik, 2019). The descriptive analysis aims to reveal the specific ways in which researchers within the CSS community interpret and prioritize ethical guidelines, highlighting the influence of internal discourse, shared methodological preferences, and disciplinary traditions on ethical decision-making. By investigating these intra-community norms, the paper seeks to understand how ethics are practically understood and acted upon.

The paper then transitions to a normative analysis, adopting an institutional ((Herzog, 2023)and social epistemological perspective. This lens emphasizes the relational dimensions of CSS research, paying particular attention to the power dynamics (Taylor, 2023) between researchers, data subjects, and the broader socio-cultural context. It highlights that research ethics in this domain is not merely about adhering to formal rules, but about navigating, framing, and building trustworthy relationships in increasingly digitalized data environments. From this relational perspective, the paper argues that the ethical dimensions of research should be responsive to the values and perspectives of affected stakeholders, acknowledging that the production of knowledge is a social endeavor that carries both epistemic and moral responsibilities. Further, by exploring the interplay between institutional structures and individual researcher autonomy in framing ethics, this paper underscores the need for a more reflexive, and context-sensitive approach to ethical reasoning within the field. Ultimately, this paper will contribute towards a more nuanced understanding of ethical challenges and potential solutions within the CSS community, aiming to foster greater accountability and trustworthiness in research practice.

Herzog, L. (2023). Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy. Oxford University Press.

Leslie, D. (2023). The Ethics of Computational Social Science. In E. Bertoni, M. Fontana, L. Gabrielli, S. Signorelli, & M. Vespe (Eds.), Handbook of Computational Social Science for Policy (pp. 57–104). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16624-2_4

Salganik, M. J. (2019). Bit by Bit: Social Research in the Digital Age. Princeton University Press.

Taylor, L. (2023). Data Justice, Computational Social Science and Policy. In E. Bertoni, M. Fontana, L. Gabrielli, S. Signorelli, & M. Vespe (Eds.), Handbook of Computational Social Science for Policy (pp. 41–56). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16624-2_3