Conference Agenda

By focusing on biorobotics, my talk explores the epistemological foundations necessary to support the transition from biological models to technological artifacts. To address this transition, I analyze the position of the German philosopher Thomas Fuchs, who offers one possible approach to the problem of the relationship between bio-inspired technology and biology. While Fuchs defends the idea of a unique ontological space for humans, I argue that his categorical distinctions face significant challenges in establishing a robust epistemic foundation capable of grounding the transition from biology to technology.

After identifying at least three interwoven reasons for rejecting Fuchs’ epistemic foundation, I examine how, through what methods, and by means of which practices, the newly bio-inspired object is accessed and shaped. Drawing on the philosophy of science and technology in practice, I argue that the plurality of answers to this question provides a potential epistemological foundation within the diverse frameworks of practices that produce bio-inspired objects. By doing so, I contend that robots and technological objects possess their own validity and mode of existence within the systems of practices that create them. This argument leads me to propose that the transition from biology to technology involves a translation of language games and forms of life, rather than a mere projection of organic forms onto technology. In this context, the human being, through bio-inspired practices, becomes homo translator.

By addressing the epistemological basis for pluralistically grounding the transition from biological models to technological ones, my approach aims to: (i) concretize and examine the relationship between biological and technological models, and (ii) investigate the features and validity of bio-inspired objects. This dual approach offers a more concrete and pluralistic understanding of what bio-inspired sciences and technologies are and what they can (or cannot) do.

In an influential paper, Verbeek has suggested to expand the (post-)phenomenological repertoire of describing human-technology relations with the cyborg relation to capture what is at stake when “the human and the technological actually merge rather than ‘merely’ being embodied” (Verbeek, 2008, p. 391). According to Verbeek, a new entity comes about when humans use implanted technologies such as neurotechnology, antidepressants, or pacemakers. In this paper, we reject the phenomenological and moral validity of the cyborg relation. Instead we suggest the concept of interwovenness (as an additional dimension orthogonal to the existing (post-)phenomenological theoretical scheme) to capture the particular experiential intimacy of some human-technology relations that Verbeek is after.

We argue that Verbeek’s cyborg relation presupposes a problematic picture of the living body as static and closed-off from its environment, which is at odds with a central notion in phenomenology: the distinction between the objective and lived body. The lived body has dynamic boundaries, and cannot be thought of as static and closed-off from its environment, (Plessner, 1975). This perspective leads us to argue that we have always been ‘cyborgs’ (De Mul, 2014), and that Verbeek’s cyborg relation is grounded in a phenomenologically questionable view on the lived body. Moreover, based on empirical findings, we argue that the experience of using implantable technologies can be described by the existing human-technology relations.

Secondly, the term cyborg can be stigmatizing to people who use implantable technologies, which makes the use of the term ethically concerning. Reasoning from critical disability studies, the term has been and could be used in a dehumanizing and othering way (Shew, 2022). In light of these two concerns (the descriptive/phenomenological and the normative/ethical), we propose to reject the cyborg relation as a new human-technology relation altogether.

Still, we are sympathetic with Verbeek’s fingerspitzengefühl that something phenomenologically and ethically distinct is at stake with the technologies that inspired his argument, for example, Brain-Computer Interfaces. We propose to capture this difference in intimacy by adding a second dimension orthogonal to the repertoire of post-phenomenology that spans across the existing human-technology relations: interwovenness. Embodiment, hermeneutic, and alterity relations can all be experienced in a more or less interwoven way, depending on how closely a technology is entangled with our embodied relation to the world. For example, a smartphone is typically not intimately embodied but it is intimately interwoven, and a pacemaker vice versa.

The addition of this second dimension allows us to more accurately capture different unique intimate human-technology connections. And in doing so, this adapted conceptual scheme provides new ways to reveal and argue what is ethically at stake when humans and technologies are intimately related.

De Mul, J. (2014). Artificial by Nature: An Introduction to Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology. In J. De Mul (Ed.), Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology: Perspectives and Prospects. Amsterdam University Press.

Plessner, H. (1975). Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philoso- phische Anthropologie.

Verbeek, P.-P. (2008). Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human-technology relations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 387–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9099-x

Shew, A. (2022). How to get a story wrong: Technoableism, simulation, and cyborg resistance. Including Disability Journal, 1(1).

This paper is an appeal to philosophers of technology and engineering to more often integrate first-person stories, narratives and creative methods in research as well as education. I argue this would make more space for questions of personal experience, embodiment and existence – crucial philosophical questions, yet often underrepresented. In order to investigate how this could be done I will first, tell an autobiographical narrative about the intimate impact of neurotechnology; and second, tell about a pilot course in which my engineering students wrote their own science fiction story. I present both cases as potentially useful material in education and research, and will ask the audience for critical feedback.

Autobiographical stories as well as fictional narratives stimulate imagination, understanding and empathy. They provide a means to imagine a variety of scenario’s, take different perspectives, empathise with the social and personal experiences and reflect upon possible consequences. Narratives can be a strong incentive for debate. I argue they will make engineering philosophers and students more aware of the intimate impact of contemporary as well as future technological developments, which could positively influence engineering theory, research and practice.

First, I will share a personal story of what I call my ‘cyborg-experience’. It is an autobiographical narrative about the physical, emotional and existential impact of neurotechnological interventions. In order to make sense of my experiences, I make use of Nancy's concept of ‘the intruder’. I show how my brain, deep brain electrodes and surgical scalpels can be understood as intruders of my embodied self. My aim is to demonstrate how first-person stories may contribute to reflection upon the intimate impact of neurotechnology.

Second, I will show how fictional narratives could be used in education to address questions of science and technology on a more profound level. I will discuss ‘The Laboratory of Science Fiction’, a pilot course in which my engineering students wrote their own science fiction story in order to ‘experiment’ with the future possibilities of science and technology. The process of creative writing and thought experimentation successfully functioned as a means to critically reflect upon not only more general moral and social issues, but also on their personal relationship with technology. It was a means to investigate their responsibilities as an engineer, and to identify and express their own emotions.

As said, I wish to conclude with a discussion with the audience on the two cases.