Conference Agenda

Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) coined the term "post-normal science" to refer to a particular strategy for solving scientific problems characterised by uncertain facts, disputed values, high risks, and urgent decisions. "Post-normal science" introduces a new temporal framework for scientific and technological development, marked by the need to provide solutions in response to pressing issues. Post-normal times (Sardar, 2010) are times of diversified and open futures, yet subject to technological optimisation and rationalisation (Wajcman, 2015). Consumer societies in developed capitalism create contexts of urgency to encourage the population to adopt certain technologies uncritically, through the creation of needs. In this scenario, consumption is prioritised over risk assessment, leading to the use of intimate technologies without full knowledge of their potential impacts on health, identity, privacy, security, desires, etc. A clear example of this is menstrual cycle tracking applications, which, by collecting personal and health data, may pose privacy risks without users being fully aware of them. This uncertainty and lack of transparency generate vulnerability in users, making them passive recipients of technology.

In this contribution, we explore how these technologies, despite being designed to improve users' lives, often inadvertently create or exacerbate vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are often linked to the lack of transparency in how data is collected, processed, and utilised, leaving users with limited control or understanding of how their personal information is being used. By analysing the ways in which the design, deployment, and adoption of certain technologies can introduce risks to privacy, security, and well-being, we aim to highligh the tensions in our present relationship with technologies.

In response, we advocate for an active and reflective role for users. We question how it is possible to intervene in the development of such technologies to reduce these vulnerabilities. This involves not only advocating for greater accountability and transparency on the part of developers and corporations but also considering the implementation of regulatory frameworks that ensure the ethical use of technology. Additionally, we examine the importance of fostering a more active and informed role for users in the technological design process, allowing them to participate meaningfully in the decision-making that affects their lives. By incorporating these considerations into the development of new technologies, it is possible to create a more equitable and secure environment for users—one that respects their autonomy and minimizes potential risks.

References:

Funtowicz, S.O., Ravetz, J.R. (1993). Science for the Post-Normal Age. Futures, 25(7): 739-755.

Sardar, Z. (2010). "Welcome to postnormal times". Futures 42(5): 435–444.

Wajcman J. (2015). Pressed for time: The Acceleration of Life in digital capitalism. University of Chicago Press.

Technical objects are better understood as ongoing processes than as finished objects—they evolve, adapt, and transform over time in response to user interventions and changes in the environment. Yet established theories in design ethics, particularly postphenomenology and Value-Sensitive Design, often treat the technical object as a static entity, overlooking how it continues to be reconfigured once it enters public use. In this paper, I argue that this oversight fosters a form of alienation—both at the individual and community levels—where users are distanced from the ongoing evolution of the very technologies they rely upon. At the individual level, people can be alienated when they perceive themselves as mere consumers rather than active participants, lacking any real capacity to modify or tinker with artifacts. At the community level, a disconnect emerges when design ethics frameworks introduce technical objects from the outside, while bypassing local, incremental practices of repair, reconfiguration, and everyday innovation.

Drawing on the work of Gilbert Simondon (1958/1980) and contemporary scholarship emphasizing a “process turn” in philosophy of technology (Young, 2024; Coeckelbergh, 2023), I propose the notion of technical expression as a means to address this alienation. Technical expression refers to the activity in which individuals “express themselves through the way they intervene with the machine,” be it during invention, maintenance, or radical repurposing. These interventions reflect personal preferences, creative impulses, and a unique understanding of a technology’s capacities acquired through hands-on experience. More importantly, technical expression spawns entire communities—such as ikeahackers.net or 3D printing forums—where members share and refine each other’s interventions, creating a “living repository of technical possibilities” that keeps technologies dynamic, culturally embedded, and open to grassroots innovation.

While I acknowledge that constraints of design, manufacturing, and intellectual property often limit the degree to which users can engage in such expression, I argue that the crux of the problem is when no meaningful intervention in its ongoing evolution is possible. In these fully closed systems, artifacts cease to appear as living, evolving practices and instead become static commodities shaped solely by corporate or design-elite interests. Recognizing that technologies are never truly finished challenges us to develop design ethics frameworks that honor this processual ontology. My hope is that by foregrounding technical expression—and by acknowledging its potential trade-offs with values such as security or intellectual property—we can begin to mitigate alienation and create more inclusive, adaptive approaches to the design and development of technology.

References:

Coeckelbergh, M. (2023). Technology as Process. Thinking Through Science and Technology: Philosophy, Religion and Politics in an Engineered World. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 55–68.

Simondon, G., Mellamphy, N., & Hart, J. (1980). On the mode of existence of technical objects (p. 1980). London: University of Western Ontario.

Young, M. T. (2024). Technology in Process: Maintenance and the Metaphysics of Artefacts. In Maintenance and Philosophy of Technology (pp. 58–85). Routledge.

Abstract

Critics of the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (DNP, Vaccari, 2013) often advocate for an account with multiple natures rather than a dualistic one, or attempt to reduce functions to structures. The Dispositional Account of Technical Functions (DAF), recently proposed by Mitchell Roberts, exemplifies the latter approach. Its central claim is: “If x is a technical function of artifact A, then x is ultimately referring to a disposition of A” (Roberts, 2024). Based on reasons such as the formal similarity between functions and dispositional properties, as well as the neater ontology of this approach, and the metaphysical location of functions is much clearer, Roberts reduces technical functions, in the general sense, to the intrinsic modal properties (i.e., dispositions) of technical artifacts as physical objects. Meanwhile, subcategories of technical functions that involve intentional concepts (such as malfunctions) are viewed merely as outcomes of user expectations in epistemology, in virtue of agents' ascription and ultimately socio-cultural facts, without the same ontological status as dispositional properties. This distinction explains why different subcategories of functions can be treated as varieties of the same thing.

In this paper, we will attempt to argue that intentions metaphysically grounds functions and thus have an ontological status, and that Roberts' use of "ultimately refers" should be understood as characterizing a metaphysical grounding relationship. Additionally, We will invoke Martin Peterson’s concept of "half-strong dual-basis supervenience"(Peterson, 2022) to explain the relationship between structures and functions. This is a supervenience theory that can account for the two-way underdetermination (UD) between higher-order objects and their material basis, as proposed by Houkes and Meijers. It posits that technical functions strongly supervene on material properties but weakly supervene on intentional history. Based on the claim that grounding entails supervenience (Chilovi, 2021), We will modify DAF in line with Peterson’s supervenience theory to say: “If x is a technical function of artifact A, then x is ultimately referring to a disposition and intentional history of A.” This revision not only introduces a dispositional account into the metaphysics of the dual nature of technical artifacts but also reinforces the irreducibility of functions to material structures.

Reference

Chilovi, Samuele (2021). Grounding entails supervenience. Synthese 198 (S6):1317-1334.

Peterson, Martin (2022). What Do Technical Functions Supervene On? Techné Research in Philosophy and Technology 26 (3):413-425.

Roberts, Mitchell (2024). A dispositional account of technical functions. Synthese 204 (3):1-19.

Vaccari, Andrés (2013). Artifact Dualism, Materiality, and the Hard Problem of Ontology: Some Critical Remarks on the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program. Philosophy and Technology 26 (1):7-29.