Conference Agenda

Bernard Stiegler is one of the few philosophers of technology that explicitly formulates a theory of desire. This theory has both phenomenological and psychoanalytic aspects: on the one hand, Stiegler draws from Husserl to show that technologies shape retentions and protentions thereby structuring human anticipation. On the other hand, he is inspired by the work of Freud when discussing the relationship between anticipation and desire. Drawing from the work of Stiegler, this presentation addresses the following question: can technology destroy desire?

The main goal of this presentation is to clarify why, in the context of Stiegler’s theory of technology and his interpretation of Freud, it makes sense to ask this question. The first step in doing so is to recognize the radical nature of this question vis-à-vis approaches in the philosophy of technology, like mediation theory (e.g., de Boer, 2021; Kudina, 2023; Verbeek 2011), that speak about how technology (or technologies) shapes humanity. Formulating the question of whether technology can destroy desire rather asks if technology can destroy humanity. “To destroy,” here, does not refer to the factual elimination of all human organisms, but rather to the annihilation of human desire through the construction of a system that makes sure that each individual desires “what he [sic] is supposed to desire” (Marcuse, 1955, p. 46). The question of this paper can then be reformulated as “can technology create a system in which people desire what they are supposed to desire?”.

According to Stiegler (2011), answering this question requires moving beyond Marcuse’s framework and to recognize technology as a crucial organizer of libidinal energy. This paper will first clarify how to understand the notion of technology in the context of Stiegler’s oeuvre to subsequently clarify how it can emerge as an organizer of libidinal energy. Secondly, it will link the issue of libidinal energy to the annihilation of desire by showing how a particular organization of libidinal energy might constitute a mass without individuality. This, for Stiegler, would effectively constitute a situation in which we can no longer meaningfully speak of desire. In conclusion, I will flesh out some characteristics of a “drive-based” society (Stiegler, 2009) in which desire is no longer present.

References:

de Boer, B. (2021). How scientific instruments speak. Lexington.

Kudina, O. (2023). Moral hermeneutics and technology. Lexington.

Marcuse, H. (1955). Eros and civilization: A philosophical inquiry into Freud. Beacon Press.

Stiegler, B. (2009). For a new critique of political economy. Polity Press.

Stiegler, B. (2011). Pharmacology of desire. Drive-based capitalism and libidinal dis-economy. New Formations, 72, https://doi.org/10.3898/NEWF.72.12.2011

Verbeek, P.P-. (2011). Moralizing technology. University of Chicago Press.

AI-driven platforms like Tinder profoundly shape how users relate to their desires and identities. From a Lacanian perspective, these platforms function as a “Big Other,” promising mastery over uncertainty and complete fulfillment of desire. This promise is tempting because it offers to resolve the structural lack that defines human subjectivity. However, Lacanian theory reveals that such promises are inherently illusory, as no external system can eliminate this lack. Tinder illustrates how digital environments reinforce Lacanian clinical structures. The psychotic user identifies entirely with algorithmic outputs, relying on matches to define their sense of self. The perverse user manipulates their profile to fulfill the algorithm’s imagined desires, reducing themselves to objects of jouissance. The neurotic user oscillates between obsessive doubt and hysterical overinvestment in the quest for a perfect match, perpetuating cycles of dissatisfaction. Despite these pitfalls, AI platforms also create opportunities for singular self-formation beyond neurosis. By disrupting the fantasy of completeness and exposing users to the Real, Tinder can challenge users to confront their desires critically. To realize this potential, platforms must avoid commodifying desire, foster ambiguity, and emphasize reflective detachment. Features like algorithmic transparency, randomized “serendipity modes,” and prompts for self-reflection can help users move beyond reliance on the algorithm and engage with their split subjectivity. This paper argues that AI platforms, though fraught with risks, can be reimagined as tools for fostering singularity, enabling users to navigate their desires authentically and acknowledge their uncomfortable human condition.

This paper examines the psychological effects of engaging with deadbots—artificial intelligence systems designed to simulate conversations with deceased individuals using their digital and personal remains—from a psychoanalytic perspective. The research question is: How does interaction with a deadbot alter the process of mourning from a psychoanalytical perspective? Drawing on first-person testimonies of users who interacted with Project December, an online platform dedicated to creating deadbots, the study investigates how these interactions reshape the experience of mourning and challenge our understanding of death. Grounded in psychoanalytic theories, particularly object relations theory, the paper explores the complex emotional dynamics at play between humans and deadbots. It argues that deadbots function as transitional objects or “projective identifications tools”, offering a distinctive medium for emotional processing and memory work. Projective identification in deadbots begins when an individual transfers aspects of their relationship with the deceased—such as fantasies, emotions, or memories—onto the chatbot (phase 1). This act of splitting is driven by anxiety and repression, as the individual feels the need to distance themselves from the deceased by externalizing these emotional contents. The projection process then compels the chatbot to replicate these traits (phase 2). In practice, this means that the individual starts to treat the chatbot as though it embodies or represents the qualities of the deceased. For example, they might project the deceased person's mannerisms, personality traits, or even specific phrases onto the chatbot, expecting it to respond or behave in a similar way. As the chatbot increasingly mimics these qualities, the individual perceives them as externalized, reinforcing the sense of separation. This cycle of pressure, imitation, and validation becomes crucial for the eventual reintegration of the projected content (phase 3), allowing the individual to reprocess and incorporate those emotions back into their psyche.

By framing deadbots within the psychoanalytic tradition, this research seeks to deepen the discourse on the psychological, existential, religious, and ethical dimensions of AI in the context of grief and mourning.

In this paper we offer a critique and reworking of the concept of reciprocity as it is predominantly understood in HRI (human-robot interaction) literature. Reciprocity is in HRI understood from the perspective of ‘the golden rule:’ doing onto others as they have done onto you. We show that this understanding implies a utilitarian, symmetrical and dyadic view of reciprocity, that this understanding lays both a descriptive and normative claim on HHI (human-human interaction) and that a different understanding of reciprocity in HHI) and HRI is possible and desirable. We show that a golden rule perspective of reciprocity is particularly problematic in designing companion robots – human-like robots designed to establish social relationships and emotional bonds with the user. In this paper we provide a different understanding of reciprocity based on the philosophical anthropology of Jacques Lacan. We show how Lacan's conception of reciprocity is deeply intertwined with his psychoanalytic theory, particularly through the Aristotelean conceptual pair automaton and tuché. For Lacan, reciprocity goes beyond purely pre-structured, rule-based approach to encompass aspects that challenge predictability and foster mediation, creativity, disruption and transformation. This view, we propose, provides a richer conceptual framework than the dominant perspective of the golden rule, allowing for a more appropriate understanding of reciprocal HHI and HRI. We illustrate this view through a Lacanian interpretation of the film Lars and the Real Girl (2007), in which the protagonist forms a romantic relationship with a lifelike doll. We conclude by providing suggestions for designing social robots that support rather than replace reciprocal HHI through a Lacanian lens.