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Session Overview
Session
(Papers) Well-being
Time:
Thursday, 26/June/2025:
11:50am - 1:05pm

Session Chair: Mariska Bosschaert
Location: Auditorium 2


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Presentations

AI’s undervalued burden: Psychological impacts

Marcell Sebestyen

Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Department of Philosophy and History of Science

This work aims to address the surprisingly underexplored yet increasingly critical psychological risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI). Media and academic discussions largely focus on speculative scenarios, like machines overthrowing society, whereas philosophical debates in AI ethics delve into other hypothetical concerns, such as artificial agents achieving sentience and consciousness. However, far less attention is given to other immediate and extensive impacts AI may already exert.

These effects include possibly significant influences on mental well-being, social behavior, and human identity, as the scope of human interaction with these systems is expanding across all aspects of daily life. Overreliance on AI threatens to undermine individual human agency, decision-making, intellectual abilities, and creativity. The overarching integration of the technology affects cognitive development and reshapes social relationships, potentially amplifying isolation and damaging self-worth. Scholars also suggest that AI-driven social media algorithms are contributing to rising social anxiety and fueling alienation.

A particular cause for concern is the phenomenon of anthropomorphism in the context of social AI, as these machines – whether embodied robots or merely software-based chatbots – are intentionally and specifically designed with the aim of promoting the projection of human traits, intentions, and emotions onto these systems. This not only creates mental burdens for users but might also divert attention away from the real ethical and societal challenges AI poses.

The views we hold on the consequences of AI development are decisively shaped by our metaphysical assumptions, determining which risks are considered and prioritized. For instance, the possibility of machine consciousness or suffering may be dismissed in some ontologies, while other frameworks might force us to unquestionably accept artificial agents as moral subjects. This reflects historical precedents, such as the Cartesian view on animal suffering, where the absence of a soul was believed to deny animals the capacity for pain, leading to the acceptance of animal exploitation that persists to this day.

The study strives to bring light to a tension present in the AI risk discourse: while predominantly anthropocentric, these debates often undervalue the psychological tolls. Although mental health is fundamental to the well-being of our species, the effects of this technology on our psyche and cognitive development are remarkably underestimated, a fact that demonstrates the shortcomings of implementing "human-centered AI" as a frequently proclaimed policy and development guideline. Addressing this gap is essential to understanding and mitigating the broader societal implications of AI.

Overall, as AI becomes more ingrained in human life, the technology’s psychological burdens could significantly influence human existence and mental health. Despite the profound implications, psychological risks remain substantially overlooked in media and academic AI risk narratives. This analysis seeks to highlight these neglected dimensions, emphasizing the current and future psychological effects of AI on individuals and society.



Personal well-being in the digital age: on the role of the sense of self

Lyanne Uhlhorn

Eindhoven University of Technology, Netherlands, The

This paper explores the intersection of digital technology and personal well-being through the lens of the sense of self. I argue that personal well-being, being about prudential value (e.g. what is good for you), is necessarily linked to the person in question and their unique point of view. Ultimately, it is connected to ‘you’, your self, or, more specifically, your sense of self. Especially in contemporary digital societies, where traditional sources of meaning—such as community, religion, and tradition—are diminishing in influence, greater responsibility is placed on individuals to define how to cultivate the good life (Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009). These conditions place increased responsibility on individuals to construct their own sense of purpose and well-being, emphasizing the importance of understanding the self as a central component of this process.

Traditional well-being theories—hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and objective list theories (Parfit, 1984)—offer valuable insights but remain insufficient for addressing the complexities of well-being in the digital age. Subjective theories emphasize pleasure or the satisfaction of desires but often fail to capture the richness of subjectivity for human flourishing. Objective theories, on the other hand, may emphasize meaning, values, and personal growth but overlook the role of the individual perspective (Fletcher, 2015). This gap underscores the need for an approach that considers the complexity of the self in relation to well-being. Since well-being fundamentally concerns what is good for an individual, it must integrate a nuanced understanding of the self as the foundation for personal well-being.

To this end, some theories of well-being have evolved to include individualistic dimensions such as self-determination, self-development, and self-esteem (Joshanloo & Weijers, 2024). Psychological research identifies authenticity, or alignment with one’s core or true self, as a foundation for subjective well-being (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Sheldon et al., 1997). However, the concept of the true self is often vague or oversimplified as a purely intrinsic entity and warrants deeper exploration informed by philosophical traditions. By synthesizing insights from phenomdenology and ontology, specifically the narrative non-substantialist self and non-self views, I argue that the sense of self is comprised of two components (Gallagher, 2011; Zahavi, 2005; Velleman, 2006), and define it as the interplay between one's phenomenological experience (e.g. ‘basic consciousness’) and the constructed self-concept as an episodic self-narrative. Together, these components form the unique subjective perspective.

A sense of self that is conducive of well-being must exhibit qualities that align with its identified nature. Achieving this is increasingly challenging in digital society, with increasing online identities, fragmented experiences, and the overwhelming diversity of perspectives and ideals create complexity and disorientation for self-construction. To address these challenges, I identify the qualities of a sense of self that is conducive to well-being, including: coherence, clarity, flexibility, agency, and valuableness. By acknowledging the role of the self in personal well-being, this approach offers a more comprehensive understanding of the digital age’s impact on self-construction and well-being, and promises to enhance the practical promotion of well-being in a digital age.

References

Fletcher, G. (Ed.) (2015). The Routledge handbook of philosophy of well-being. London: Routledge.

Gallagher, S. (2011.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self, online edn, Oxford Academic, 2 May 2011,

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001

Goldman BM, Kernis MH. (2002) The role of authenticity in healthy psychological functioning and subjective well-being. Annals of the American Psychotherapy Association, 5(6):18–20.

Joshanloo M. , Weijers D. (2024) Ideal personhood through the ages: tracing the genealogy of the modern concepts of wellbeing. Frontiers in Psychology, 15,

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1494506

Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons

Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., Arndt, J., & King, L. A. (2009). Thine own self: true self-concept accessibility and meaning in life. Journal of personality and social psychology, 96(2),

473–490. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014060

Sheldon KM, Ryan RM, Rawsthorne L, Ilardi B. (1997) “True” self and “trait” self: Cross role variation in the big five traits and its relations with authenticity and well being. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology.73:1380–1393.

Velleman J. D. (2006) Self to self, selected essays

Zahavi, D. (2005) Subjectivity and selfhood, investigating the first-person perspective



 
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