Conference Agenda

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Session Overview
Session
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Time:
Thursday, 26/June/2025:
10:05am - 11:20am

Session Chair: Robin Hillenbrink
Location: Auditorium 8


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Presentations

Avatar attachment in virtual worlds: The conflict between self-fictionalization and authentic representations

Clemens Uhing

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Institut für Wissenschaft und Ethik

Recent advancements in VR (Virtual Reality) hardware and VR applications have expanded the consumer market significantly, making the ethical challenges of VR and virtual worlds increasingly pressing. Individuals who present themselves in virtual worlds via avatars can be negatively affected by virtual actions of other people as well as by virtual events. Potential harms include infringements of autonomy and mental distress, e.g. by being harassed by other users or by witnessing violent scenes. Special problems arise from the ‘openness’ of avatar creation.

Users of virtual worlds can aim for an accurate representation of their real characteristics, for an identity totally different from their identity in the real world, or for selective representations that blend fiction and reality (Freeman & Maloney 2021). In other words, users must choose between authentic self-representations and fictionalizing themselves. At the same time, the sense of embodiment that VR creates allows for various levels of ‘avatar attachment’ (Wolfendale 2007). Consequently, users of virtual worlds find themselves in tension between the two poles of authentic self-representation and fictionalization of their selves.

In my presentation, I will argue that decisions on where to place oneself on the fictionality-authenticity continuum are highly relevant for the ethical implications of virtual worlds. First, as conceptualized with the proteus effect (Yee & Bailenson 2007), embodying avatars with a specific set of properties can make individuals behaviorally confirm the subtle implications of these properties, thus potentially inflicting (virtual) harm or perpetuating stereotypes. Second, strongly identifying with a divergent virtual self may undermine one’s sense of authenticity, hindering self-expression and fulfillment in the real world. Third, the more of their authentic self users represent in a virtual world, the more vulnerable they are to feeling that virtual harassment, exclusion and offenses are directed against their real-world identity, which in turn increases the potential for psychological harm.

I will show that the decision on whether to fictionalize or authentically represent oneself is often limited by the technical affordances of an application, by legal or netiquette regulations or influenced by users’ weighing practical trade-offs. Therefore, I will argue that recognizing the ethical implications of self-representation in virtual worlds is crucial for responsibly creating and safely using virtual reality technologies and their corresponding virtual worlds.

References

Freeman, Guo / Divine Maloney: Body, Avatar, and Me. In: Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 4, CSCW3 (2021), S. 1–27.

Wolfendale, Jessica: My avatar, my self: Virtual harm and attachment. In: Ethics and Information Technology 9,2 (2007), S. 111–119.

Yee, Nick / Jeremy Bailenson: The Proteus Effect: The Effect of Transformed Self-Representation on Behavior. In: Human Communication Research 33,3 (2007), S. 271–290.



AI ‘ancestors’? AI avatars in African ethics

Christopher Wareham

Utrecht University, Netherlands, The

AI avatars are an intriguing emerging technology. Typically debates about AI avatars focus on issues concerning ownership and replication of one’s data. However, recent work situates the discussion within ethical debates about superlongevity. Is creating an AI avatar of oneself a desirable way to prolong life? African perspectives have been brought to bear on artificial intelligence more generally, and on questions related to superlongevity. However, questions about the desirability of prolonging lifespan through the use of AI avatars have to date been unaddressed in African moral philosophy. In this paper, I argue that the desirability of extending lifespan in this way hinges a) on whether AI avatars could be considered ‘ancestors’, as understood in African traditions. This in turn depends a) on whether avatars could be ‘persons’ and b) on whether communal partiality towards avatars is justified. I claim that avatars could under certain conditions be persons, but that partiality is severely weakened. The upshot is that while avatars could be a valuable source of communal memory, they could not be ‘ancestors’ in senses important in African traditions.



 
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