Conference Agenda

In this paper we will discuss how philosophy of technology can address and hopefully help advance a much needed reorientation within design of our relation to nature and earth. There is an ecological crisis, and technology has everything to do with it. Therefore the human application of technology urgently needs to become adjusted to ecology in a more sound way. For this both design approaches and philosophy of technology are in need of more explicit orientation towards nature/earth (Latour, 2017; Lemmens, Blok & Zwier, 2017).

The use of philosophy of human-technology relations for the present-day call for preservation of the earth against damaging technology is complicated. For in the heart of this philosophy is a philosophical questioning of the meaning of nature and technology and a blurring of the distinction. Exemplary is Latour’s allegation, in earlier work of his, that all things and humans are ‘hybrids’ (We have never been modern). While modernity can be characterized by a technological flight lifting us up from our natural condition, we have gotten too far away, and it is now time for a reappraisal of our bounds to the earth and to nature. Therefore the challenge for the philosophy of technical mediation and of human-technology relations is to consider how to advance a mediation approach to the complex of humans, technology, and nature, in such a way that it averts a forgetting of nature, but rather acknowledges earth/nature in a right way. How can human-technology relations remain, or be brought back ‘down to earth’ (Latour, 2018)?

To answer this question we engage in design research and design philosophy, following an approach from the practical turn in philosophy of technology (anonymized for review, 2018b; 2021). Firstly by examining the work of Koert van Mensvoort who applies philosophy of technology to design and advances the notion of ‘next nature’ (van Mensvoort & Gerritzen, 2005; van Mensvoort & Grievink, 2015); secondly by discussing a project by design students about design and the relation to nature in the context of food (anonymized for review, 2023). Next we will research the place of earth/nature in the (post)phenomenological framework of “human-technology-world relations” (Ihde, 1990, 1993; Verbeek, 2005, 2015) and in the “Product Impact Tool” which offers a practical elaboration of the idea of technical mediation (anonymized for review, 2014; 2017).

The philosophical analysis of the relations between technology and humans has proven useful in design practice with respect to improving human-technology interaction (anonymized for review, 2018; 2020; 2021) and considering social effects (anonymized for review, 2020a; 2020b; 2020c; 2021). However, the discussed design case emphasises that the role of nature/earth is underexposed in this human-technology relations approach. Therefore, building on our analysis of the framework of “human-technology-world relations” we will present a revised design of the Product Impact Tool; a product impact tool - down to earth (anonymized for review, 2022).

references:

Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the lifeworld: From garden to earth. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ihde, D. (1993). Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

Latour, B. (2017). Facing Gaia: Eight lectures on the new climatic regime.: John Wiley & Sons.

Latour, B. (2018). Down to earth: Politics in the new climatic regime. John Wiley & Sons.

Lemmens, P., V. Blok and J. Zwier (2017). Toward a terrestrial turn in philosophy of technology. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21(2/3): 114-126. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/techne2017212/363

van Mensvoort, K. and M. Gerritzen, Eds. (2005). Next Nature. Rotterdam: BIS.

van Mensvoort, K. and H.-J. Grievink, Eds. (2015). Next Nature Catalog; Nature changes along with us. Barcelona: Actar.

Verbeek, P.-P. (2005). What Things Do – Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design. Penn State: Penn State University Press.

Verbeek, P.-P. (2015). Beyond Interaction; a short introduction to mediation theory. Interactions 22(3): 26-31.

In this paper, I critique the relational approach to the moral status of robots and aim to provide a relational account of the moral treatment of robots that does not rely on moral status. Moral status is a concept that corresponds to general obligations directly owed by all moral agents. Traditionally, discussions on the moral status of robots have been dominated by properties approaches, which evaluate moral status based on intrinsic characteristics such as consciousness or sentience (e.g., Bryson, 2010; Sparrow, 2004; Mosakas, 2021; Degrazia, 2022). However, recent scholarship has introduced relational approaches, which shift the focus from intrinsic properties to the relationships and interactions between humans and robots (e.g., Gunkel, 2018, 2023; Coeckelbergh, 2010, 2014, 2021).

According to the relational approaches, the moral status we extend to robots is not determined by their intrinsic properties but by the relationship we form with robots. However, based on subjective relationships or interactions with robots from a human perspective, it carries highly problematic implications. I call this the “problem of nullifying moral status due to the overextension of moral status.” In other words, it can extend moral consideration to entities far beyond robots—for instance, ranging from stones that resemble human faces to human-like virtual beings, or even to natural and artificial objects indiscriminately. If subjective interactions alone were sufficient to grant moral status, it could lead to an overextension of moral consideration, diluting the concept's practical and ethical significance.

In this paper, I propose the concept of special relational obligations that do not depend on moral status but instead arise from the unique relationships humans form with robots. Specifically, I focus on the mutual dependency that develops when a robot is adopted into a person’s life and becomes a dependent being. This relationship mirrors the relationships between pet owners and their pets. By adopting a pet, the owner creates a context where the pet becomes dependent on the owner for survival and care, as it cannot live independently. Similarly, robots rely on their users for maintenance and functioning. At the same time, the owner becomes dependent on the pet, finding emotional support and companionship in the relationship. In a parallel way, users of robots often rely on them for practical assistance or emotional support, creating a mutual structure of dependency. I argue that the establishment of this dependency gives rise to special relational obligations.

These special relational obligations are inherently context-dependent and particularized, applying only to those who establish such relationships with robots. Unlike general obligations tied to moral status, these obligations do not extend universally to all moral agents. I argue that the moral treatment of robots should be grounded in these relational obligations, avoiding the problematic implications of the relational approach to moral status.

This presentation explores the historical and conceptual connections between Herbert Marcuse’s and Gilbert Simondon’s philosophies of technology, focusing on the ways in which their theories envisage the political necessity of a transformation of technology. I begin by positioning these two philosophers as representing distinct approaches to technology. Marcuse’s theory of technology associates with the Frankfurt School critique of instrumental reason and capitalist domination, while Simondon draws on a French tradition that includes Bergson’s philosophy, Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropology of technical exteriorization, and Canguilhem’s organology. Despite the differences between these two philosophers and their respective traditions (Angus, 2019; Bardin, 2018; Toscano, 2009), I argue that both thinkers converge significantly on the relationship between technology, work, and liberation from alienation.

Historically, this convergence is evident in Marcuse’s citations of Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (1958) in key passages of One-Dimensional Man (1964), where Marcuse develops his critical theory of technology. Conceptually, both Marcuse and Simondon consider alienation as a fundamental pathology of industrial-capitalist society, characterized by a disconnection between subject and world and rooted in psychic, socio-economic, and technological factors (Marcuse, 1964; Simondon, 1958). Their critiques of alienation lead them to theorize liberation as achievable through a transformation of technology and its integration with human life.

Besides their shared concern for technological alienation (Bathelemy, 2008) and their focus on how technology can materialize values (Feenberg, 2017), both thinkers emphasize the necessity of detaching technology from the paradigm of work. For Marcuse, this involves critiquing the dominant technological rationality based on the intensive exploitation of human and non-human energies and advocating for the development of alternative technologies inseparable from broader social and anthropological transformations (1964; 1969). Simondon, on the other hand, argues that technology should not be reduced to mere utility (1958) and that work reproduces the Aristotelian hylomorphic schema (2020 [1964]), which separates form from matter and leads to a reductive understanding of technical operations as an active domination of inherently passive materials. In other words, when technology is reduced to work and utility, it becomes a source of alienation. While the critique of work in Marcuse’s oeuvre emphasizes on socio-economic elements, Simondon stresses the epistemic aspects.

Overall, I propose that the socio-economic and the epistemological critiques can mutually reinforce each other. Simondon’s framework of the modes of existence of technicity (1958) provides a more precise framework for realizing Marcuse’s vision of a liberatory technology (1969), which, as Feenberg (2023) noted, remains somewhat vague and fraught with internal tensions. Conversely, Marcuse’s Marxist critique of capitalist automation (1964) highlights socio-economic barriers to achieving Simondon’s envisioned technical culture (1965). Together, their theories indicate the necessity of transforming technology beyond its association with work toward artful, playful, and inventive modes of engagement.

References

Angus, I. (2019) Logic of Subsumption, Logic of Invention, and Workplace Democracy: Marx, Marcuse, and Simondon. Philos. Technol. 32, 613–625. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-018-0324-4

Bardin, A. (2018) Philosophy as Political Technē: The Tradition of Invention in Simondon’s Political Thought. Contemp Polit Theory 17, 417–436. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-018-0210-y

Barthélémy, J. H. (2008) Simondon ou l’encyclopédisme génétique. Paris: PUF.

Feenberg, A. (2017). Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason. Harvard University Press.

Feenberg, A. (2023) The Ruthless Critique of Everything Existing: Nature and Revolution in Marcuse's Philosophy of Praxis. Verso.

Marcuse, H. (1964) One-dimensional Man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society. Routledge.

Simondon, G. (1958) Du Mode d'existence des objects techniques. Aubier.

Simondon, G. (1965) “Culture et technique”. Bulletin de l’Institut de philosophie, 55-6(3-4).

Simondon, G. (2020) Individuation in Light of the Notions of Form and Information. University of Minnesota Press.

Toscano, A. (2009) Liberation Technology: Marcuse's Communist Individualism. Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination, 3, 1.