Conference Agenda

This paper employs Paul Ricoeur's theory of threefold mimesis to compare the creative capacities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human semantic innovation. While recent studies suggest LLMs can match human performance on creativity tests, we argue that a broader hermeneutical approach reveals fundamental differences in how humans and LLMs generate meaning. First, LLMs lack the embodied experience that grounds human semantic innovation, operating instead through mimesis lexios (imitation of language) rather than mimesis praxeos (imitation of action). Second, following Ricoeur's emphasis on the role of reception in creativity, we argue that LLM outputs require human embodied interpretation and engagement to be recognized as genuine semantic innovation. This analysis suggests that LLMs’ creative potential remains fundamentally tied to human embodied experience and interpretive engagement, and contributes to ongoing debates about computational creativity and human-AI collaboration in meaning-making.

These are two related chapters from the book Human Freedom in the Age of AI.

Chapter 10: Design for Democracy: Deliberation and experimentation.

This chapter proposes to move from critiquing the negative impact of digital technology on democratic practices to exploring avenues for ‘designing for democracy.’ The first part of the chapter briefly presents two philosophical theories of democracy: deliberative democracy of, e.g. Rawls and Habermas, and democracy as experimentation and inquiry in the pragmatism of, e.g. Dewey and Addams. It illustrates how the two theories led to two different kinds of projects of ‘design for democracy’: the Brazilian open-government platform e-Democracia for citizen participation in deliberation and legislation, and Carl DiSalvo's Careful Coding project for the data-driven maintenance of the built environment in a local community. The second part of the chapter presents two design approaches which arguably reflect the two democratic theories: approaches where the design process is enriched and improved by stakeholder involvement and participation (Value-Sensitive Design and Scandinavian Participatory Design) and those where design is used to spark and expand social critique and to support the development of existing civic experiments (Critical and Social/Participatory Design). The chapter concludes by proposing to support both approaches to design for democracy and to explore possibilities of creating a mixed approach.

Chapter 11: Expanding democracy: Design for aesthetic engagement and anti-power.

In this chapter two more possible directions for designing for democracy are introduced. First, expanding the idea of the ‘public sphere’ to explicitly include also non-argumentative forms of contribution, namely aesthetic, artistic, or expressive forms of engagement, and supporting the design of projects that may contribute to democratic debates via aesthetic engagement (more-than-argumentative democracy). Second, expanding democratic participation from deliberation to ‘anti-corruption,’ and designing systems that may support counter-powers in democratic as well as non-democratic regimes (more-than-representative democracy). More-than-argumentative democracy may be supported by new media projects giving voice and visibility to underrepresented groups like migrants, raising awareness of the risks and opportunities of new technologies. More-than-representative democracy can be supported by projects that collect evidence against corrupted or authoritarian regimes with the help of new technologies.

The Routledge International Handbook of Engineering Ethics Education was published open access in December 2024 as a collaborative and international project bringing together 6 editors and more than 100 authors across the world. The volume contains 6 sections which elaborate on the foundations of engineering ethics education, teaching methods, accreditation and assessment, and interdisciplinary contributions, from the perspectives of teaching, research, philosophy, and administration.

This session aims to discuss the significance of such a resource as well as the intersections between engineering ethics education and the philosophy of technology. Potential topics for discussion address prospects of engineering ethics education and the legitimacy of engineering ethics education as a field of research relevant to philosophy and philosophers. Reading the entire volume is not mandatory for taking part in this session (although reading the introductory chapter ‘Mapping engineering ethics education’ might help the discussion).

Theorists of technology sometimes describe human experience and action as “mediated” by technologies (Ihde 1990, 2006; Latour 1994, 1999; Verbeek 2005, 2011; Van den Eede 2011, Arzroomchilar 2022). But their accounts of what technological mediation is, including its principal components and modes of operation, differ from one another significantly. In this paper I conduct a critical review of some prominent accounts, highlighting problems and oversights in each. I then trace these problems to two basic sources: (1) overly narrow assumptions about what kinds of phenomena can count as “technological mediation,” how cases of technological mediation work, and what should be done about them; and (2) an insufficiently reflective approach to how technological mediation fits within a larger taxonomy (including, most saliently, non-technological mediation and non-mediational technology-involving relations). I then sketch the outlines of a theory of technological mediation that overcomes these problems. After drawing a few implications from this theory, I conclude.

In this paper, we argue that equating technology with applied science has been prematurely dismissed based on arguments that have not undergone thorough scrutiny. Prima facie, there are two main reasons to revisit the question of whether technology should be equated with applied science. Firstly, the historical case often cited by those who argue that technology can advance independently of science -the steam engine- is controversial and can be refuted with evidence showing that it resulted from James Watt's scientific knowledge. Secondly, even if we acknowledge that there is unique technological knowledge in various domains (as exemplified by engineering theories), this alleged epistemic independence does not suffice to refute the equation [technology = applied science]. Based on the above, we argue that although the origin (historical dimension) of technology is practical, science -with its theories and methods- constitutes a conditio sine qua non (epistemological dimension) for technology as a form of knowledge.