Conference Agenda

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the relationship between fertility and women’s employment has changed over time, and especially so during the post-recession years in Norway. The point of departure is a puzzling decline in fertility since 2010 where the fertility level has dropped from 1.9 to 1.40 in 2023 in Norway. At the individual level, employment and income are fundamental to people’s lives and the changing role of women’s employment on fertility could be a key factor in understanding the downward trend in fertility level in Norway. To test this, we will explore the effect of full-time employment, part-time employment or not being employed on fertility, and see whether this effect has changed over time in Norway, and whether such effects vary by educational attainment. We will using high-quality register data with yearly information spanning across almost three decades (1993-2020). To account for the possibility that the birth process and the employment process could be jointly determined, we apply joint modelling of hazard models for different birth transitions and employment. Preliminary results shows that especially the effect of working full-time increases stronger for both entering motherhood and for higher parities.

The accelerating fertility decline in the most gender equal countries of the world seemingly contradict the central tenet of macro-level theories that predict high fertility in the presence of gender equality. We offer a comprehensive assessment of the individual behavior from which these trends aggregate. We link attitudes towards gender roles and fertility intentions in three Nordic countries.

Using recent data (2020-2022) and a multidimensional instrument on gender equality attitudes from the Generations and Gender Programme for Denmark, Finland and Norway on n=15,547 women and men, we identify three attitude profiles of which one is situated beyond the “non-egalitarian-egalitarian continuum”. The profiles are clearly associated with fertility intentions for childless individuals. We further provide evidence for two theoretical mechanisms that intervene between gender equality attitudes and fertility intentions.

Gender equal societies with a favorable opportunity structure for people to have the children they want, may still face challenges associated with low fertility: Fertility intentions are lowest among egalitarians, i.e., the largest population in these countries. While realizing a satisfying division of household labor with their partner enhances fertility intentions among egalitarians more than in the other groups, they do not necessarily prioritize parenthood as their main life objective.

In the Italian context of (lowest-)low fertility rates and female labour market participation, we examine the relationship between personal income and fertility by gender over the last two decades. We (con)test the "New Home Economics" traditional gendered division of labour, hypothesising lower fertility among higher-income women due to opportunity costs and traditional breadwinner norms. Given the rising economic prerequisites for parenthood in affluent countries and shifting family values and behaviours, even in Italy—a stronghold of traditionalism—women’s income may be gaining importance for fertility in absolute and relative terms. This expectation is especially plausible in the Central region of Tuscany, which is relatively wealthier and less traditionalist. We leverage Tuscan longitudinal administrative data (2003–2021), matching records from INPS employment histories with IRPEF-MEF tax declarations (n ≈ 200,000). Beyond the established effects of employment status on fertility, our study contributes by analysing the association between absolute and relative (i.e., the share of total household income) income in married couples and their transition to a first and second child over two decades, employing panel fixed-effects and event history analysis to minimise unobserved confounding. Preliminary findings indicate that higher income increases men’s fertility more than women’s, while job instability discourages childbearing, especially for women.

In his model of the intergenerational transmission of fertility, Thornton (1980) identifies parental economic status and family size as two distinct root causes influencing the fertility levels of the next generation. The current research investigates whether these two factors interact in shaping both fertility levels and social class indicators in adulthood. Using a sample of 20,566 respondents aged 45 and older from the first wave of the Generations and Gender Program, we estimate the combined impact of the mother's completed fertility and educational levels on three key outcomes for her adult child: (1) number of children ever born, (2) odds of never marrying, and (3) educational attainment and mobility. Our findings reveal that each additional sibling significantly increases the respondent’s fertility, especially for those with highly educated mothers. Offspring of highly educated mothers are also more likely to remain unmarried by age 45, though this likelihood decreases with more siblings. Moreover, increased sibling count correlates with lower educational attainment and reduced chances of reaching medium or high education levels. Among respondents with lower-educated mothers, each additional sibling elevates the odds of low educational attainment and increases the likelihood of downward educational mobility if the mother has medium education.

This paper investigates how a mother's well-being during her first experience of motherhood influences both her desire and likelihood of having a second child. Using data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study, the emotional state of mothers when their first child is approximately 9 months old is examined across four key areas: emotional support from their partner, life satisfaction, frequent tiredness, and experiences of misery or depression. The findings indicate that partner support and life satisfaction positively affect both the desire for a second child and the likelihood of having one, as shown by longitudinal data. The study also explores how these emotional states are shaped by broader life contexts, including work conditions, financial concerns, and the partner’s involvement in domestic and caregiving responsibilities.

Fertility declines in Western countries following the Great Recession have spurred interest in the role of subjective economic uncertainties for fertility. While perceived employment stability has been a focus, recent studies suggest resilience to employment loss may be a more critical factor in shaping fertility intentions. This study explores Sweden's fertility decline by examining resilience and fertility intentions among childless couples. Utilizing data from the Swedish Generations and Gender Survey 2021, logistic regression is employed to analyze the link between resilience and fertility intentions, across sociodemographic groups and perceptions of employment stability and risk attitudes. The results indicate that uncertainty regarding resilience is linked to lower fertility intentions for men, with no significant association observed for women. This association is particularly notable among foreign-born individuals. While a clear relationship between low resilience and fertility intentions was not found across the entire sample, such links seem more evident among economically vulnerable groups. The findings thus suggest that uncertainty about one's resilience can inhibit fertility planning, particularly among certain subgroups. However, the study's limited sample size and cross-sectional design limit the generalizability of these conclusions.

To examine the Afghan paradox of a dramatic 2000−2015 drop in fertility simultaneous with only a small improvement in female health and education, this study tests the hypothesis of a negative effect of protracted conflict on both fertility outcomes and preferences. Although the results overall suggest that long-term conflict does indeed reduce the number of pregnancies and living children, the effect of conflict on ideal family size is relatively small. This finding not only implies that women’s fertility partially decreased because of widespread violence, but also that conflict relates to unmet desired fertility. Moreover, if conflict were to cease, and the rate of decrease in Afghanistan’s fertility would slow, under the current constraints to women’s education and access to health services, women and child health would worsen.

This study revisits the relationship between income and fertility. While the neoclassical family model (Becker, 1991) posits that male income fosters childbearing and female income reduces it due to opportunity costs, recent findings highlight contradictions to this framework, showing that high-income individuals of both genders often have more children in industrialized societies. However, limited research exists on the temporal evolution of this income-fertility nexus and its gender-specific dynamics.

Focusing on Italy-a country with persistently low fertility, significant income disparities, and increasing economic precarity-this study investigates whether and how the association between income and fertility has changed over time.

Longitudianl data from the EU-SILC survey (2004–2021) are used to examine the association between individual and household income and first and second childbirth transitions. Preliminary results show significant differences in the probability of transitioning to a first or second child based on income levels in Italy, but limited support for a changing importance of income over time.