For many information goods, longer publication cycles are more economical, but often result in less timely information. While the digitalization of publication processes makes shorter cycles more economically viable, in practice, not all competing firms choose to publish more frequently. In this paper, we use a game-theoretic model to determine how information providers choose publication cycles and prices under competition and inform publishers of adaptive strategies for digitalization.

In knowledge-intensive businesses, projects are often initiated by individuals, who may then look for collaborators to push their idea forward. What operating dynamics arise in equilibrium when the decision-making process on project ownership and project execution is decentralized? Using a stylized principal-agent model, we find that principal investigators have a tendency to keep ideas for themselves too much, but when they share the project ownership, they tend to over delegate.

Demographic and professional activity data on 227 Operations Management faculty in 22 U.S. public schools is compared to their base salaries (all 227 faculty) and total compensation (a subset of 15 schools and 150 faculty). A primary factor correlated with pay levels are “A” journal publications. Local school effects (cost of living), willingness to move institutions, taking on administrative duties, and achieving Fellow status in professional societies are all correlated with higher salaries.