Modern traceability technologies promise simplified recalls, increased visibility, and verification of sustainable practices. However, the benefits obtained from traceability are conditional on technology adoption throughout a supply chain. Hence, traceability initiatives need to subsidize some early adopters within a network of supply chains to achieve broad diffusion. We address the problem of identifying this "seed set" and describe how the supply chain network structure affects the choice.

We design a behavioral simulation using a blockchain-enabled market for trading suppliers’ capacities among competing retailers. Retailers have different valuations for goods and order before knowing their demand. After demand realization, retailers can trade among themselves. While average initial orders do not differ significantly compared to the control group, significant improvements in inventory allocation and profits are achieved, and trading strategies arise that mitigate demand risk.

This study examines the impact of (a) leasing or selling decisions and (b) alternate supply chain forms (CSC or DSC) on digital piracy and supply chain profits. We develop an analytical model where supply chain members lease or sell digital goods in the presence of pirated goods in a two-period setting. We find that leasing digital goods to buyers has higher supply chain profit than selling in a CSC, and selling provides higher supply chain profit than leasing in a DSC.