Biological theories and quantitative methods in psychology are frequently criticized for fostering reductionist accounts of complex human phenomena. While calls for rigorous quantification—often seen as a solution to the replication crisis—reflect a poorly understood positivism, critiques of this approach sometimes overlook the potential of natural science methods when used with epistemological awareness. This oversight weakens a critical psychology perspective by ignoring that humans are natural beings embedded in physical systems, whose biological foundations and everyday activities yield both qualitative and quantitative traces.

This paper argues for integrating natural science approaches into critical psychology, guided by an understanding of their explanatory limits and in accordance with Haraway’s concept of ‘situated knowledge.’ Two case studies illustrate this: First, research into neuronal mechanisms and epigenetics shows how biological methods can reveal the developmental and sociocultural dynamics of psychological phenomena. Second, the use of sensor and log data (e.g., tracking sleep, activity, and digital interactions) provides quantitative insights into everyday behavioral patterns of users. While such data have been linked to both creating self-awareness (e.g., of mood swings and related stressors) and problematic self-optimization, I explore how the computational frameworks behind these analyses—rooted in systems theory and probabilistic causality—challenge simplistic causal models and support a dynamic, embodied view of human interactions with digital tracking.

Together, these cases demonstrate that a nuanced engagement with natural science and quantitative methodologies can enrich critical psychology, fostering a more complex understanding of human experiences.

The essence of dialectical approaches to neuropsychology is their developmental perspective towards psychological processes. Phylogeny represents an important moment of this development and has been considered by many as a key to understanding psychic processes (e.g. Anokhin, 2016; Holzkamp, 1985; Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). In the present study, we investigate the role of phylogenetically old units of behavioral control located within Anokhins' (2016) ‘collateral pathway’ within the functional system of cortically mediated classical conditioning in mammals. The collateral pathway processes stimuli according to their biological significance rather than their pysical properties. Rats of the experimental group were conditioned with a biologically significant conditioned stimulus (CS) and others associated either with a neutral CS or omitted learning in a first experimental block. In a second block, animals were then conditioned with a new CS that coincided in its biological significance, but not in physical features, with the experimental group's previous CS. Confirming our hypothesis, we found that animals of the experimental group showed an superior response specificity to the novel stimulus. We interpret the result as evidence for the conservation of an ancient unit of behavioural control and learning along the collateral pathway.

Gaston Bachelard, a French philosopher, founder of the "historical epistemology" (Rheinberger), coined the paradigm shifts of physics in the early 20th century, epistemic breaks. Psychology was not a discipline studied in that sense that it could serve him as a good example for finding epistemic breaks. However, looking at the research of the contributions to this panel, we might find these breaks also in psychology, especially in relation to causation and causality. This paper discusses how the incorporation of new methods, models and technologies leads to theoretical shifts. With Bachelard, it illuminates that the „phenomenotechnology" that makes new aspects visible and available to research is paramount. The paper continues to reflect on parallels of the „historical epistemology“ and the enterprise of Critical Psychology to develop concepts and methods in psychology methodologically, thereby following ideas that were discussed, among others, by Vygotsky and Lewin. It ends with the question whether the concept of circular causality connects to a historical perspective of psychological theorizing.