This paper challenges the assumption – explicit in the conference call and pervasive in critical psychology – that theory operates as a form of political engagement. Different critical strands of psychological theory often present theoretical work as inherently political. I argue, however, that such claims frequently overestimate the transformative capacities of theory and obscure the institutional conditions under which it is produced and circulated. I examine how theoretical claims are shaped by the positionality of their academic producers, the constrained audiences they address, and the disciplinary histories that condition their political reach. Theory produced within academia is structurally limited as a political tool: its political potential depends not on its conceptual content but on its embedding within institutional, pedagogical, administrative, or activist practices. Within neoliberal universities, however, theory circulates largely as a symbolic gesture – a moral vocabulary for scholars rather than a driver of political transformation – since academic labor is shaped by performance metrics, precarious contracts, and distinct institutional cultures. This raises two key questions: from what position can theorists claim political agency, and who is the subject of theory under such conditions? A related question concerns the audience of theory, since universities function as echo chambers in which most theoretical writing addresses only other academics in closed circuits of journals, conferences, and university programs. Critical theory thus remains largely insulated from the social fields it purports to critique. Moreover, psychology’s disciplinary history (Danziger, Morawski, Rose) shows that its political impact has traditionally emerged through its entanglement with governance, administration, and technologies of control rather than through its theory or conceptual critique. Finally, I argue for the temporal asymmetry between theory and political action. Following Hegel’s dictum that the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk, I propose that theory is typically reactive rather than catalytic: it arrives after social and political ruptures, offering retrospective interpretation rather than antecedent intervention. This dynamic is illustrated by a recent wave of spontaneous and decentralized student and civil mobilization in Serbia, which unfolded without theoretical articulation or academic guidance and only later demanded scholarly explanation. The example underscores the limited political agency of theoretical psychology and highlights the gap between theory’s political aspirations and its actual effects.