Conference Agenda

Using Austrian administrative corporate tax return data, we examine how MNEs respond to three major anti-base erosion and profit shifting (anti-BEPS) policies: (i) interest and royalty deduction limitations, (ii) private Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR), and (iii) controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. We find that limits on interest and royalty deductions curb income shifting out of Austria, with little evidence that exposed MNE entities substitute into alternative shifting channels. In contrast, private CbCR largely offsets these effects, while also incentivizing MNEs to increase economic activity in foreign low-tax affiliates. Exposure to the CFC rule similarly leads MNEs to increase economic activity abroad and continue income shifting, consistent with efforts to qualify for active-income safe harbors under the Austrian regime. Overall, our evidence suggests that anti-BEPS measures have nuanced effects. Some measures effectively constrain income shifting, whereas others primarily induce real economic responses without reducing the extent of income shifting.

The decentralized structure of crypto-assets constrains third-party reporting and weakens tax enforcement. The European Union’s eighth revision of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC8) addresses this gap by extending mandatory reporting and automatic cross-border exchange of information to crypto-asset service providers. This paper examines how cryptocurrency markets respond to this expansion of tax transparency. Using an event study design, we analyze daily returns for the 32 largest cryptocurrencies around the formal adoption of DAC8. We document a statistically significant negative abnormal return of 0.61\% at the 1\% level. The results are consistent with markets pricing higher expected enforcement and reduced after-tax returns following the integration of crypto-assets into a harmonized transparency regime.

This paper studies whether revolving-door moves from the tax administration to the private sector create private surplus for firms and rents for workers. Using linked administrative employer–employee data from Norway and Finland, we track hires of former tax-administration employees and outcomes for both hiring firms and movers. Firm-level event studies show that tax payments decline after a hire. Worker-level event-study difference-in-differences designs show sharp wage increases at the transition. We use a triple-difference specification isolates the premium specific to tax-administration-to-private moves from general job-switch wage gains. The results suggest that enforcement-specific know-how is tradable. Firms’ tax payments drop after acquiring this expertise, and workers capture part of the surplus through higher wages. We interpret the findings through a framework that distinguishes compliance-capital from avoidance-capital, with welfare implications ranging from reduced administrative frictions to revenue displacement and distorted competition

This paper examines the efficacy of tax amnesty programmes in developing countries using administrative tax data from Zambia. I assess the impact of the 2017 tax amnesty programme on compliance among small and medium-sized firms. I find that programme eligibility increases compliance on the extensive margin, raising the probability of reporting positive sales by 17–17.9 percent and of making a tax payment by 16.5 percent. However, the amnesty has no significant effect on reported sales or taxes paid on the intensive margin. Among enrolled firms, the programme generates short-lived improvements in on-time filing and sales reporting, while on-time payment and tax payments remain largely unaffected. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the fiscal cost of waived penalties and interest exceeds the additional revenue generated. The finding suggests the amnesty acted as a temporary compliance stimulus rather than a sustainable revenue-enhancing intervention, highlighting the need for ex-ante evaluation and improved compliance initiatives.