Conference Agenda

We estimate the effects of monetary policy shocks on the disposable income distribution in the Netherlands. We use administrative register data on income from labor, wealth and transfers, and on hours worked, for the period 2005–2024. We find a U-shaped effect of an expansionary monetary policy shock on disposable incomes, where the largest gains are for the lower end of the income distribution. The main driver of the effects is labor income. The effects on income from wealth and transfers are much smaller, but the effect on wealth income causes an uptick in the overall effect at the top of the income distribution. We find that hours worked are a key driver of the labor income effect. Furthermore, we find that workers that switch firms following a monetary policy shock exhibit much larger income gains and changes in hours worked than workers that stay with the same firm.

In the face of persistently rising income inequality, the capacity to redistribute becomes essential, particularly in the context of human capital formation. Using panel data on public education funding across U.S. school districts between 2005 and 2019, we document a negative response of local funding to higher inequality. This effect is driven by reduced redistribution in poorer districts, while in wealthier districts, it is mitigated by the positive impact of a larger tax base. The results remain robust to an instrumental variable approach that addresses the endogeneity of the local income distribution. Our findings emphasize a new inequality amplification mechanism, in line with recent theoretical work.

Despite broad public support for progressive taxation, the current U.S. tax system is among the most regressive in history. This paper tests whether social and institutional ties between legislators and the ultra-rich help explain this mismatch. We use large language models to classify the progressivity of the full universe of tax-related bills introduced in Congress since 1973. Using publicly available biographies, we then construct a new dataset linking Members of Congress to billionaires through overlap in higher-education institution, program, and graduation cohort. Our preliminary findings suggest that legislators with greater exposure to billionaires during college and university are more likely to sponsor regressive tax proposals and fewer progressive ones. These results support the view that elite networks can transmit political influence through informal social channels. The paper identifies a measurable pathway of elite influence and speaks to debates on transparency, accountability, and unequal political representation in the United States.

Public goods can be funded by private donations or government provision. With multiple public goods and heterogeneous preferences, the choice of funding method gives rise to a potential conflict between income groups. In this paper, we address the interaction between heterogeneous preferences over different public goods and how to fund them. There may be a conflict of interest between donors and governments when there is some public provision of public goods. This conflict can be resolved using differentiated subsidies. To analyse optimal policy we apply an 'agnostic welfare function', which highlights how the welfare treatment of warm glow motivations affects optimal policy. We provide sufficient conditions under which a differentiated subsidy welfare dominates public provision. Finally, we derive the structure of optimal public good funding by combining tax financed provision and differentiated or uniform donation subsidies.