Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:41:01am WEST
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E12: Third-Party Reporting, Audit Targeting, and Non-Filing
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Third-party Reporting and the Platform Economy. Insights on Activity and Transaction Volumes 1: University of Mannheim, Germany; 2: University of Mannheim, Germany; 3: University of Mannheim, Germany; 4: University of Mannheim, Germany This paper presents descriptive evidence on economic activity reported under DAC7, the European Union’s newly introduced third-party reporting regime for online marketplaces. Using novel administrative data from Germany, we study platform-mediated sales between businesses and consumers as well as among peers. We document the scale, composition, and distribution of online marketplace participation and revenue volume across platforms and transaction types. The analysis provides a comprehensive empirical characterization of activity reported under DAC7 and establishes a baseline for future research and policy evaluation.
Optimal Audit Targeting with Machine Learning: Evidence from Pakistan 1: Tulane University, United States of America; 2: Federal Board of Revenue, Pakistan This paper develops empirically implementable algorithms for optimal audit targeting with machine learning. We derive a sufficient statistic-based targeting algorithm that depends on three individualized causal effects: the immediate revenue recovered from an audit, the causal effect of an audit on long-run tax revenue, and the marginal administrative cost of an audit. We show that these effects can be estimated with a variety of machine learners including causal forests, LASSO, gradient boosted trees, and neural networks using the universe of Pakistani income tax returns, exploiting years in which audits were assigned completely at random. We implement our targeting algorithms in out-of-bag years, comparing them to the real-world policy when audits were targeted. We show that the real-world audit program in Pakistan lost almost 173,000 Rs ($1, 700) in net revenue per-audit, while our optimal policy generates 285,000 Rs ($2, 800) in expected net revenue per-audit.
Optional Non-Filing And Tax Over-Withholding: Evidence From South Africa 1: University of Muenster, Germany; 2: University of Oslo, Norway Tax withholding in pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) systems is common across developing countries and considered essential for the effective enforcement of personal income taxation. To limit administrative burdens, PAYE is often coupled with generous tax non-filing options. Drawing on rich tax administrative data for South Africa, we show that such PAYE systems are associated with sizable and non-refunded over- withholding of taxes, raising taxpayers’ effective tax rates above legally applicable rates. Vulnerable taxpayer groups – low-income workers, young taxpayers and indi- viduals who recently entered the formal labor market – are disproportionally affected. PAYE over-withholding can deter formal labor supply and impair the progressivity of the personal income tax schedule.
Income Tax Frequency University of Bordeaux, France This paper studies whether the timing of income taxation affects welfare when earnings fluctuate within the year. Standard tax systems assess liabilities annually, implicitly treating taxpayers with the same yearly income as equivalent, even if one earns smoothly while another faces sharp monthly swings. We develop a theoretical framework showing that, under a convex tax schedule, shifting from annual to monthly tax adjustment, holding total yearly tax constant, is improving when income is nondecreasing and reduces liquidity risk. We compare two within-year regimes: Vickrey’s cumulative averaging rule and a new Monthly Compensated (MC) mechanism based on uniform rescaling of monthly tax liabilities. Using monthly data from the U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we simulate welfare effects. Income volatility is concentrated at the bottom and linked to employment transitions. The MC system yields substantial gains for low-income, high-volatility individuals across states, while Vickrey delivers smaller but positive gains.
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