Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:07:00am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C15: Retirement, Saving, and Disability Insurance
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Do State and Local Governments Offer Competitive Compensation? 1: Federal Reserve Boaard, United States of America; 2: Brookings Institution This paper examines the relative compensation of state and local government workers compared to their private sector counterparts in the U.S. Augmenting standard data sources on compensation with information on benefits derived from unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data and asset-based methodologies for valuing benefits, we document a significant erosion in the public sector compensation premium. While state and local workers received approximately 10 percent higher total compensation than comparable private sector workers in 2011, this differential had declined to negative 5 percent by 2023. This decline stems from multiple factors: relative public sector wages have fallen steeply, public sector retiree health care benefits have diminished, and the historically greater job stability in government employment has eroded. We also document that cash, as opposed to accrual, accounting for defined benefit pensions significantly skews the trend in relative public sector compensation in the ECI—the principal data on U.S. benefit compensation.
Social Reference and Voluntary Public Pension Participation: Evidence from Institutional Variation in South Korea 1: Jeju National University, Jeju, Republic of Korea; 2: Soongsil University, Seoul, Republic of Korea; 3: Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea Public pension systems with mandatory coverage often retain a voluntary enrollment margin, yet take-up varies sharply across localities under common statutory rules. Using a panel of 232 Korean municipalities over 2003–2024, we distinguish participation prevalence from the density of settings generating repeated interpersonal contact. Prevalence excludes voluntary enrollees by construction and is instrumented with registered-workplace density. The first stage is modest, and weak-instrument-robust Anderson–Rubin tests fail to reject a zero prevalence effect in every specification (preferred model: p = 0.219; 95 percent set [−0.887, 16.411]). By contrast, private-academy density is positively and precisely associated with voluntary enrollment across fixed-effects and IV specifications and three denominators: a one-standard-deviation increase corresponds to about 405 additional enrollees per million residents, 14 percent of the mean. The association strengthens with the municipal female-to-male ratio and is steeper for female enrollment. Because academy density is not instrumented, these are conditional associations, not causal effects.
Beyond Pension Age: The Macroeconomics of a Longevity Society 1: Independent consultant based at European Commission, JRC-Seville, Spain; 2: European Commission, JRC-Seville, Spain This paper explores the potential impacts on European economies transitioning from an ageing society, where longer lives strain public finances, to a longevity society characterised by prolonged productivity. In a heterogeneous-agent overlapping generations model, we show that raising the pension age together with increased labour market participation among older adults yields significant fiscal benefits in Germany, Spain, and Sweden, permitting a reduction in the consumption tax rate of between 3 and 5 percentage points. Our research sheds light on how longevity-focused policies can serve as a guide for fiscal resilience amid demographic transitions.
Partial Disability Insurance 1: University of Copenhagen; 2: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) To curb the rising costs of disability insurance (DI) programs, some countries have implemented partial DI programs, which require recipients to work part time to receive benefits. However, the welfare implications of such programs remain unclear. The analysis in this paper is twofold. First, we introduce a conceptual framework that identifies the central tradeoffs between partial DI programs, full DI programs, and ordinary employment. Second, we study a reform in Denmark that expanded the Danish partial DI program. We find that the reform substantially altered selection into the program by shifting individuals who would otherwise have entered the full DI program into the partial DI program. At the same time, we find no evidence of negative selection from ordinary employment. However, existing partial DI participants work fewer hours when starting new spells, suggesting that imperfect screening entails efficiency costs.
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