Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 18th July 2026, 03:47:38am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E03: Elections, Representation, and Accountability
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Homevoters, Homeowner Candidates and Spatial Voting Patterns 1University of Turku / Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE, Finland; 2University of Turku; 3Aalto University This study examines geographic preferences in voting and the spatial inequalities in representation in municipal elections in Finland, focusing on the role of homeowners. We show that the homeownership rate in a polling district is associated with higher turnout, more votes given to local candidates, and better representation. For candidates we find a vote distance-gradient (more votes from close to home) that is steeper for homeowner candidates. Finally, our difference-in-difference results suggest that when an individual moves to a new district inside the same municipality, it negatively impacts the share of their own votes that come from their old home district. This effect is also more pronounced when individuals move away from districts with a high homeownership rate compared to those moving from areas with low homeowner share, also consistent with homeowners favoring candidates who live in the same area.
Fairness without Equality: Effect of Election System Proportionality on Female Representation 1University of Turku; 2King's College London; 3Stockholm School of Economics Proportional electoral systems—often lauded for their inclusivity—do not automatically translate into higher women’s representation. Exploiting population-based thresholds that exogenously change district magnitude in Brazil and Finland, we use regression discontinuity designs to show that increasing “seat inclusivity” does not yield statistically significant gains for female candidates. As larger district magnitude may relax how constrained parties are in responding to voters’ demand, our zero results are consistent with candidate supply—rooted in party gatekeeping or self-selection into candidacy—being the critical bottleneck for female representation, rather than voter bias. Our findings challenge the assumption that electoral system reform alone can close gender gaps in politics and underscore the need for complementary measures targeting party nomination strategies and broader social barriers.
Information and the Politics of School Quality: Evidence from a Nationwide Reform in Brazil 1Amazon; 2Masaryk University; 3University of British Columbia; 4Nova School of Business and Economics We use the introduction of a school-level accountability system in Brazil to estimate the effects of public information on school quality. Reports revealing that schools are high in the test score distribution increase the incumbent mayor's vote share by about 2 percentage points. The revelation of low scores reduces incumbent mayor vote share by roughly the same margin, but also causes decreased class sizes and pupil-teacher ratios in subsequent years. These effects are larger in places with more educated voters.
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