Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:07:50am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E01: Evidence on Income and Wealth Dynamics
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The Role of Industries and Occupations in the Evolution of Wage Inequality 1: Roma Tre, Italy; 2: IAB, Germany; 3: DIW Berlin, Germany This paper studies the evolution of wage inequality in Germany between 1985 and 2020 using matched employer-employee data. We analyze wage dynamics across 272 industries and four task-based occupational groups, constructing 993 industry–occupation cells consistently observed over 35 years. Total wage variance rose by 9 log points, with about two-thirds of the increase driven by widening differences between 22 cells. These mainly comprise non-routine abstract occupations in high-paying industries and non-routine manual occupations in low-paying sectors. The disproportionate contribution of these 22 cells reflects their employment concentration, growing polarization in relative wages, and stronger assortative matching between workers and firms. Overall, our findings show that rising wage inequality cannot be explained by firms or industries alone. Instead, it is the interaction between industrial structure and occupational tasks that plays a central role in shaping the growth of wage dispersion.
Death and Taxes: Inheritance Tax Planning and Unexpected Mortality 1: King's College London, United Kingdom; 2: London School of Economics, United Kingdom We use the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic as a natural experiment to identify the scale and mechanisms of inheritance tax planning in the United Kingdom. The pandemic created an exogenous mortality shock that abruptly reduced time for anticipatory planning. Linking administrative inheritance tax returns to high-frequency mortality data, we compare estates of individuals who died unexpectedly during the pandemic with observationally similar decedents from pre-pandemic years. Unexpected deaths are associated with significantly larger reported estate, raising average estate values by about £350,000, and a 5 percentage point increase in effective tax rates. We estimate that inheritance tax planning reduces effective liabilities by at least 55 percent, implying annual revenue losses of £3-4.5 billion. Inter-vivos transfers, rather than within-estate portfolio restructuring, are the primary planning margin. These findings highlight the central role of the seven-year gift rule and suggest that revenue-raising reforms should focus on lifetime transfers.
Fair Inequality 1: KOF Institute ETH Zurich, Switzerland; CEPR; CESifo; 2: Leiden University; 3: Santa Fe Institute; 4: UCL; CEPR; SFI; 5: University of Massachusetts at Amherst If differences in market labor earnings between members of a population were to be distributed identically to the observed differences between same-sex siblings, how much inequality would remain? Consistent with Rawls' principle of fair equality of opportunity, we provide an answer to this question, the “fair Gini coefficient," which we estimate for 16 medium- and high-income countries, using consistently defined administrative data. And we show that it is a lower bound for the level of inequality produced by an income-generating process in the hypothetical absence of gender and parental advantage. We find that countries with lower market earnings inequality are not distinctively fair; the fair Gini coefficient relative to total inequality differs little across countries, from Sweden to Brazil. We characterize the formal properties of our statistic and six other measures of gender and parental advantage, and provide estimates from our data set. Inheritance Tax Around the Globe Over Two Centuries: Revenue and Distributional Implications 1: Roma Tre University, Italy; 2: Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality, CUNY Graduate Center; 3: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; 4: Hunter College This paper introduces a new harmonized global database on estate, inheritance, and gift(EIG) taxation, covering more than 170 countries, and all U.S. states from 2006. We document a declining trend in the adoption and progres-sivity of EIG taxes since the 1980s. Using a two-way fixed effects (TWFE) framework complemented with an event-study approach, we find that a one percentage point in-crease in the top rate is associated with approximately 8% higher revenues between 1965 and 2022. An event-study analysis of 54 significant tax policy reforms reveals that revenues decline by roughly 50% within four years following a cut of at least 10% in top rates, with symmetric effects for rate increases of similar proportion. Finally, a one percentage point increase in the top marginal tax rate is associated with a 0.11-point decline in the Gini coefficient after 10 years, with consisten teffects across top and bottom wealth shares.
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