Conference Agenda
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Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
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B09: Pensions, Retirement, and Saving Responses
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Pension Eligibility Criteria In A Setting With Informality 1Loyola Marymount University, United States of America; 2Mount Holyoke College, United States of America In countries with robust informal labor markets, the required number of contributions to access a pension can influence formality. We study this phenomenon in the context of Brazil. We develop a theoretical life-cycle model that captures key dynamics of a contributory pension system design in a labor market with informality. Our analysis shows that the minimum years of required contributions play a central role in shaping the trade-off between higher immediate earnings in the informal sector and the accumulation of long-term pension through formal employment. Next, we examine how tightening eligibility criteria affects workers’ incentives to participate in the formal sector. We find heterogeneous responses: low-income workers, who derive greater short-term gains from informality, reduce formal participation and rely more heavily on the social pension, whereas middle-income workers increase formality to meet the stricter eligibility requirements. We find no impact for high-income workers who optimally choose to remain formal.
Saving Responses to Mandatory Pension Plans University of Zurich To boost retirement savings, many countries mandate worker contributions to pension accounts. This paper investigates saving responses to such mandates throughout the entire portfolio, leveraging detailed administrative tax data from Switzerland and a regression discontinuity design. I find that mandatory pension plans have limited effects on total savings, with an estimated crowd-out rate of 94%. Decomposing the saving response, I show that workers offset mandatory pension contributions by reducing private non-retirement savings, primarily in financial assets. By contrast, there is no substitution between mandatory and voluntary pension savings. Liquidity-constrained workers are less able to reduce private savings in response to mandatory contributions and therefore increase their total savings.
Pensions, Retirement, and the Disutility of Labor: Bunching in Brazil 1Mount Holyoke College, United States of America; 2Claremont McKenna College; 3University of California - San Diego; 4Independent Researcher Elderly workers in developing countries face frictions, such as credit constraints, in retirement decisions that may not be as common among their counterparts in the developed world. In this study, we use regression discontinuity methods to show that a large fraction of urban males in Brazil (45 percent) react contemporaneously to pension eligibility by retiring. Because retirement is not required to receive the pension and the return to working does not change discontinuously at the eligibility cutoff, workers should not react contemporaneously unless optimization frictions, such as credit constraints, are at work. Secondly, we develop a model of retirement decisions that explores how pension incentives in the face of credit constraints can influence such decisions.
The Economic Consequences of Retirement: Connecting Impacts on Workers and Firms 1Centre for the Analysis of Taxation, UK; 2University of Warwick, UK; 3London School of Economics, UK This paper investigates the firm-level consequences of labour supply shocks caused by the departure of older workers. We use comprehensive UK administrative data and leverage variation in statutory retirement ages and worker deaths. We find that firms respond to retirement primarily through external replacement rather than internal reorganisation or capital substitution, but that new hiring does not catch up. This leads to persistent contractions in workforce size and profitability. These negative effects appear driven by the loss of specific human capital, as adverse outcomes are concentrated among firms losing key workers.
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