I study VAT avoidance in private jet ownership using administrative aircraft registry data from 41 European countries linked to high-frequency flight tracking for 1,902 business jets. I document that 35% of European private jets are registered in tax havens, yet virtually none operate in their country of registration: only 7 of 664 tax-haven-registered jets are primarily grounded locally. Exploiting cross-country VAT differentials, I estimate a remarkably high tax elasticity of the registration base. A 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate raises the number of registered jets by 12.4% and the aggregate fleet value by 16.7%, suggesting that fiscal incentives drive both location choice (extensive margin) and asset valuation (intensive margin). Combining aircraft price data with statutory VAT rates, I estimate at least $1.05 billion in VAT avoidance over the past 15 years. The findings provide new evidence on the mobility of high-value assets and highlight structural weaknesses in VAT enforcement.

While the OECD has advanced multilateral reforms to curb profit shifting, countries simultaneously engage in direct negotiations with multinational enterprises (MNEs) to protect their domestic tax base. Drawing on novel micro-data from the French tax authority, offering visibility into a process that is typically highly opaque, we study these negotiations, formally known as Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs). Leveraging the staggered entry of firms into negotiations between 2002 and 2025, we argue that these negotiations have mutual benefits. On the one hand, engaging in negotiation increases a firm’s domestic corporate tax base by about €15 million per year, roughly 2% of baseline sales, which translates into fiscal revenues for the tax authority. On the other hand, negotiations reduce the likelihood of transfer-pricing corrections by about 15 percentage points, providing greater certainty to firms. We also structurally estimate a Nash bargaining model to quantify each firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the tax authority.

This study examines the shadow economy and illicit financial flows, which pose significant challenges for policymakers, particularly in developing economies with weak institutional capacity. North Cyprus is analysed as a politically isolated micro economy characterised by substantial unreported activities and capital flight yet largely underexplored in the literature.

First, the size of the shadow economy is estimated using a Structural Equation Model within a MIMIC framework. In addition to conventional variables such as taxation, unemployment, and inflation, trade flows are also incorporated. Preliminary results indicate that the shadow economy averaged 31.1% of GDP between 1980 and 2023.

Second, illicit financial flows are measured using balance-of-payments-based methodologies, revealing alternating phases of hidden inflows and capital flight exceeding 10% of GDP.

Finally, the study preliminarily finds evidence of bidirectional causality between the shadow economy and illicit financial flows, with informality, inflation, and macroeconomic instability emerging as key determinants.

This paper studies the distributional effects of corporate tax avoidance. Using linked ownership data on multinational enterprises based in France and matched employer–employee panel data, I exploit the establishment of a first affiliate in tax havens in a staggered difference-in-differences framework. I show that tax-haven entry leads to a decline in operating profits and in the domestic corporate tax base, accompanied by an increase in financial income through tax-advantaged dividend receipts. These changes are consistent with profit shifting and an increase in firms’ after-tax surplus. I then examine how the tax savings are shared within firms. While part of the gains accrues to workers, they disproportionately benefit top earners and occupations central to tax avoidance strategies. These findings suggest that corporate tax avoidance not only erodes the domestic tax base but also amplifies within-firm compensation inequality.