Private pensions are the largest component of household wealth in the UK, and the vast majority of employees are automatically enrolled into workplace pension plans. Using employer-reported pension data linked to the population census, we document that Bangladeshi and Pakistani employees are around twice as likely to opt out of their workplace pension as employees from other ethnic backgrounds. Opting out means forfeiting employer pension contributions and tax subsidies, with potentially large financial consequences: we estimate that a typical Bangladeshi or Pakistani employee who consistently opts out would have around 60% higher retirement income if they instead saved in their workplace pension. These differences persist within firms and are not explained by economic differences across ethnic groups. Instead, we present a set of evidence pointing to the importance of Islamic religious beliefs in driving the higher opt-out rates, consistent with Islamic teachings on savings.

We offer new empirical facts and insights into the determinants, dynamics, and consequences of extreme poverty in an advanced market economy, based on a novel administrative data set from France’s largest food assistance charity that is unique in its comprehensive coverage of low-income households -- in particular of homeless individuals. First, extreme poverty is largely a transient phenomenon, but a very large fraction of households is at risk of falling into food and housing insecurity. Second, children and teens are vastly over-represented in food and housing insecurity relative to their share in the overall French population. Third, inflows are highly sensitive to local macroeconomic conditions and policies while outflows only depend on individual characteristics, with an especially strong duration dependence. Fourth, housing is a luxury good, with marginal propensities to consume and price elasticities equal to zero below a subsistence threshold.

Social scientists have long believed that income rank matters to people. Rank is not a fixed characteristic, however: we can choose whom to compare ourselves to, and we are big fish in some ponds, but smaller ones in others. We conducted an experiment that elicited the income rank beliefs of a representative sample of mid-career Finns in various reference distributions. Some had the rank in one distribution revealed to them at random, but others could choose what information to acquire. We characterize the choice of reference population and its implications for well-being. We find that almost half of respondents care most about rank within occupation, while fewer than six percent are interested in national rank. Instrumental motives predominate the choice of reference group. We compare the effects of information acquired by choice and received at random, and find little difference. Last, we show that information acquisition affects real behavior.

This study proposes two theoretical mechanisms of vertical policy diffusion grounded in local political risk management rather than central government coercion. According to the proposed theoretical framework, local tax policy choices stem from the interaction between central choice architecture and local political capital. Using a dataset covering 22 tax discount categories across all 256 Israeli municipalities from 1993 to 2025, we document over 1,000 tax increases executed by reducing discounts below the Maximum Discount Choice (MDC). Although the choice architecture was designed to encourage a 'race to the bottom', this study strikingly finds that most Israeli municipalities adopted MDC. Consistent with the central hypothesis of this study, higher political capital increases the likelihood of policy diffusion via unintended nudges compared to adopting the MDC, after controlling for population size, income per capita and budget deficit. Normatively, the adoption of policies misaligned with local characteristics departs from public welfare maximization.