Conference Agenda

While tagging—the conditioning of taxes on personal characteristics correlated with earning ability—can improve efficiency, it is often assumed to lack political support because it violates horizontal equity, which stipulates treating equals equally. To empirically test this view, we conducted an online vignette experiment with a U.S. general population sample (N = 3,012) and report three results that challenge it. First, support for tagging varies substantially across tags and individuals. Consistent with theoretical prescriptions, it is higher for characteristics with a strong correlation with ability or reflecting needs. However, the immutability of a tag does not predict support, contrary to theory. Second, variation in support reflects both horizontal and vertical equity concerns. Third, other considerations, such as efficiency, also matter but less so. Incorporating fairness can either limit or amplify optimal tagging relative to a canonical utilitarian benchmark.

This study investigates how information about intergenerational and intragenerational inequality shapes fairness views and policy preferences. Using a large-scale randomized survey experiment with 4,900 respondents in Germany, we test how exposure to information on wealth and age disparities affects (i) perceptions of distributive and intergenerational fairness, and (ii) support for redistributive and future-oriented policies. We find that respondents generally underestimate existing inequalities. Moreover, providing accurate information about the extent of age and wealth disparities has little impact on left-leaning and centrist individuals but elicits a backlash among right-leaning respondents: the information increases their perceived fairness of the status quo and lowers their support for redistributive and future-oriented measures. We attribute these counterintuitive responses to skepticism about the credibility and neutrality of the provided information. Overall, the findings highlight the limits of informational interventions and the potential for factual communication to backfire in politically polarized contexts.

Why do individuals support some inequality-reducing policies while opposing others? This paper shows that heterogeneity in beliefs about policies’ distributional and macroeconomic effects is a central determinant of support, above and beyond attitudes and preferences. I develop a framework in which policy support depends on perceived self-interest, perceived effects on others' welfare, and perceived effects on the macroeconomy. I test this framework using a large, nationally representative survey of French citizens covering twelve economic policies. Beliefs alone explain 26% of the variation in policy support, outperforming demographics, political ideology, and standard attitudinal measures. Differences in beliefs account for most of the preference for predistribution over redistribution and explain nearly half of the partisan gap in support for inequality-reducing policies. Providing information on policies’ effects increases support, particularly among right-leaning respondents, leading to depolarisation. These findings identify beliefs rather than attitudes as a key margin shaping demand for economic policies.

This paper examines how voters balance inequality reduction, economic growth, and personal tax costs when evaluating fiscal policy. We implement a conjoint survey experiment with representative samples of about 2,000 respondents in each of Brazil, Spain, and the United States. Participants repeatedly chose between alternative policy packages that varied in income tax progressivity, tax revenue, spending composition, public debt or consumption taxes, and expected growth, allowing us to recover revealed preferences under realistic trade-offs.

We find weak unconditional support for inequality reduction and stronger support for growth, but this pattern is largely explained by aversion to higher taxes. When policies are revenue-neutral, voters in all three countries show substantial support for redistribution. Individual self-interest reduces support when personal tax burdens rise, while acceptance increases when revenues fund valued purposes such as education, transfers, or debt reduction.