Conference Agenda
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
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D07: Inheritance, Wealth Taxation, and Top Incomes
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The Role of Industries in Rising Inequality 1Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; 2Heriott-Watt University; 3CUNEF; 4SQW; 5Edinburgh University We analyse thirty years of Italian private sector employment data (1985-2018) to study the dynamics of rising earnings inequality. The total variance surged by 10 log points, with 55% occurring between industries, particularly in a few low-paid service sectors. Workers with low earnings ability showed increased likelihood of working in industries with low average firm premium (sorting) together with other low-earning workers (segregation). Strikingly, parallels with the US emerge. In both, inequality increased predominantly between industries and concentrated within a small number of sectors. Italy’s increase primarily stems from low-paying sectors, diverging from the more balanced growth observed in the US across high-paying and low-paying industries. Our findings suggest that despite institutional differences similar underlying forces are at work
Optimal Inheritance Taxation in the Steady State University of Corsica, France This paper contributes to the academic debate on the optimal design of inheritance taxes. I determine the effects of introducing a small linear inheritance tax in a steady state economy with an optimal nonlinear income tax schedule. I show that these effects fall into four categories. First, the introduction of the inheritance tax has a positive redistributive effect within individuals with the same labor income but different inheritance levels. Second, it has a signaling effect, which is positive if there is a positive correlation between the productivities of different generations. Third, the inheritance tax modifies the distortionary and income effects of the labor income tax. These effects have an ambiguous sign. Fourth, and finally, the inheritance tax creates an additional distortion in the bequest decision. This last effect is negative and pushes in the direction of subsidizing bequests.
Trusts and the Measurement of Top Incomes and Wealth: Evidence from UK Administrative Data 1Department of Economics, University of Warwick; 2Centre for the Analysis of Taxation (CenTax); 3Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Existing evidence on income and wealth concentration has not directly observed a major source of assets, and associated income, for the wealthy: assets held in trust. Using UK administrative data on the universe of trusts, we first document stylised facts about the trust sector. We find trusts are predominantly used for income and wealth accumulation, with only a small share of trust income distributed to beneficiaries. Second, we estimate total income and wealth held in UK trusts using imputation and income capitalisation methods. Finally, we allocate trust-held income and wealth to individual beneficiaries and assess the implications for measured inequality at the top of the distribution. We find that [results under clearance, and will be available at the time of the conference].
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