Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
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Daily Overview |
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A05: Corporate Transparency and Tax Compliance
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Anticipatory effects of corporate tax shaming: Evidence from the European Union 1Yale University; 2Institute for Fiscal Studies; 3University of Amsterdam Offshore wealth is estimated to equal 10% of global GDP. To curb tax avoidance, policymakers have adopted tax transparency reforms. We analyze the impact of the EU’s Directive on Public Country-by-Country Reporting, which mandates that large multinational corporations disclose key financial data. We find evidence that firms subject to higher media scrutiny and with ESG scores increased their effective tax rates by 5-8 percentage points (pp) in anticipation of the public disclosure of their data. In contrast, we find that banks, which are exempt from the Directive, decreased their tax rates by more than 8 pp. We document how NGO attention on banks has subsided since the announcement of the exemption, suggesting that banks may be taking advantage of reduced civil society scrutiny as attention shifts away from the industry.
The Power of Transparency: Evaluating the Role of Treaties in the Fight Against Tax Avoidance Utrecht University School of Economics, Netherlands We introduce a novel approach to analyze the role of international treaties for tax avoidance, focusing on tax transparency and information exchange. First, we use a gravity model of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment to identify ‘investment anomalies’, which do not follow real economic determinants and are likely related to tax avoidance. We regress these anomalies on a manually collected dataset of taxation treaties and information exchange arrangements to understand how treaties are related to tax avoidance. We find that Double Taxation Agreements are associated with up to 3% more tax avoidance. When adding transparency and information exchange, this effect is reversed by an average -5% reduction in tax avoidance, primarily driven by OECD Country-by-Country Reporting with a -13% effect. This demonstrates that Double Taxation Agreements should always be paired with automatic tax information exchange and that the implementation of Country-by-Country Reporting should be further promoted to reduce tax avoidance.
Corporate Tax Compliance under Enforcement Misperception 1HEC Paris; 2ifo Institute; 3LMU Munich We study whether enforcement misperception arising from the opacity of tax audit systems is a feature or a bug of corporate tax compliance. Extending the seminal Allingham–Sandmo of tax evasion, firms can reduce tax liabilities via illegal evasion or legal but resource-costly avoidance. If managers overestimate audit intensity, they substitute from evasion toward avoidance rather than truthful reporting, leaving tax revenue largely unchanged while increasing deadweight costs (advisory fees, restructuring) and reducing penalty revenue. With a risk-averse manager facing personal liability, the model delivers a closed-form interior evasion choice and predicts a weaker response to perceived enforcement among more risk-averse managers. Empirically, we combine German firm survey data with administrative audit rates across German states and size classes to identify behavioral effects and quantify welfare losses.
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